WOMEN WIN THE WAR AT VMI
Throughout the past three decades, women have made significant
progress towards securing for themselves equal protection of their rights

under the law as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 1 More
specifically, women have relied on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees all citizens that "[n]o state
shall ... den, to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." Despite the Fourteenth Amendment's constitutional assurance against discrimination, society and the courts have been slow in
reaching agreement about both the type of scrutiny with which to analyze
claims of gender discrimination and the overall place of gender-based
classifications under the Constitution. 3
Claims of gender discrimination brought pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause are currently evaluated under the judicially created intermediate scrutiny test. 4 This middle-tier level of review was created to
respond to claims of gender discrimination that the Supreme Court felt

could be evaluated under neither the strict scrutiny test nor the rational
1 See William A. DeVan, Note, Toward a New Standard in Gender Discrimination:
The Case of Virginia Military Institute, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 489, 489 (1992).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution provides in full that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United. States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id.
3 See DeVan, supra note 1, at 489 (commenting that "[tihe conflict between
women's demands for economic and professional equality and men's basic desire for privacy poses delicate questions that current Equal Protection Clause analysis cannot clearly
answer.").
4 See Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute:
An Essay on
the Judicial Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 35-36 (1993). See also Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that prohibited the
sale of beer to females under the age of 18 and to males under the age of 21); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (proclaiming unconstitutional a statute that provided that
men must be preferred over equally-qualified women to administer a decedent's estate).
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTmTONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454 (2d ed.
1988). Strict scrutiny, the highest level of scrutiny applied to equal protection claims, has

233

234

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:233

basis analysis. 6 The application of the intermediate scrutiny test to gender-based classifications reflects the notion that the government may not
discriminate based on gender unless it provides a sufficiently important
justification for the discrimination and creates a program or statute carefully designed to promote its asserted interest.7 The judiciary has developed a two-prong test for analyzing gender-based classifications under
this intermediate level of review: (1) there must be an important government interest at stake and (2) there must be a substantial relationship
between the fovernment interest to be advanced and the gender-based
classification.
In applying this intermediate scrutiny test, courts have
been applied to legislative and administrative classifications to hold such classifications
"unconstitutional absent a compelling governmental justification if they distribute benefits
or burdens in a manner inconsistent with fundamental rights." Id.
6 See Melissa Taylor, Note, The VMI Decision: A Look at the Balancing Process in
Equal Protection Cases, 60 UMKC L. REV. 393, 398-99 (1991). Reed prompted the
Court to depart from the traditional rational basis approach and instead analyze gender
classifications under heightened scrutiny. See id. at 399. Thereafter, in Craig, the Court
declared that intentional gender discrimination would violate equal protection unless substantially related to the achievement of important government objectives. See id. at 400.
Consequently, the creation of this intermediate level of review forced equal protection
analysis to become somewhat of a "macro-balancing" process. See id. Thus, where
there was once "a traditional two-sided scale with social and economic regulations on one
end and race and alienage regulations on the other, there is now a sliding scale." Id.
This resulting sliding scale is attributable to the fact that, as opposed to the two traditional levels of scrutiny, the middle level does not apply a nonrebuttable presumption to
the legitimacy of the classification in question. See id. at 401. In the absence of a nonrebuttable presumption, it therefore becomes the judiciary's obligation to explain the factors contributing to its decision as well as the process by which such factors are weighed.
See id. If the judiciary fails to explain the contributing factors clearly and adequately,
then "the intermediate level of scrutiny will remain a mask for an unexplained process of
adjudication." Kenneth L. Karst, Note, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 81, 88 (1977); see also Craig, 429 U.S. at 212 (explaining that "a careful explanation of the reasons motivating particular decisions may contribute more to an identification of that standard [of review] than an attempt to articulate it in all-encompassing
terms.").
Rational basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny applied to equal protection claims
and primarily applied to economic legislation, has been described by the Court as requiring "'some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,' with 'rationality' tested by
the classification's ability to serve the purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule .... " TRIBE, supra note 5, at 1440 (quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305,
308-09 (1966)). In applying this requirement, the Court has willingly upheld classifications based "'upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy....'" Id. at 1443 (quoting Allied Stores, Inc. v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959)).
7 See Ides, supra note 4, at 36. Given that no mathematical formula exists for
assessing the importance of the government's reasons for the discrimination or for measuring the degree to which a government statute or program must be appropriately tailored,
the intermediate scrutiny test provides courts with some latitude in making a determination whether a particular gender classification is legitimate. See id.
8 See id. Demonstrating a substantial relationship between the classification and the
government interest is somewhat of a less "elastic" concept than is measuring the impor-
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struck down gender-based classifications that reflect or reinforce irrational gender stereotypes. 9 Recent court decisions have advocated the
notion that gender distinctions, "rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic
paternalism' .. . in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in

a cage." ' 0
In one of the most closely observed and anticipated gender-bias
cases, United States v. Virginia,11 the United States Supreme Court decided that the Equal Protection Clause precluded the State of Virginia

from preserving exclusively to men, and denying to women, the unique
educational experiences and opportunities afforded by the Virginia Military Institute (VMI).1 2 The Court declared that neither VMI's pedagogi-

cal methods nor its goal of molding students into citizen-soldiers was inherently unsuitable for qualified female applicants.

The Court further

proclaimed that Virginia's proposed program for women-the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL)-was inherently unequal to
tance of the government's reasons for the classification. See id. For example, genderbased classifications can only survive intermediate scrutiny if based upon real and actual
distinctions between the sexes. See id. Furthermore, such distinctions must be in direct
relation to the interest the government is seeking to advance through means of the particular discrimination, and the government interest must be sufficiently important to bypass
the overwhelming presumption against gender-based classifications. See id.
9 See Juliette Kayyem, Recent Development, The Search for Citizen-Soldiers:
Female Cadets and the Campaign Against the Virginia Military Institute-United States v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 247, 255 (1995). Gender discriminatory laws found to "propagate outmoded and
irrational notions about the sexes" have been struck down with the same vigor with which
"courts have outlawed blatant state reinforcement of racist notions." Id. Thus, because
gender stereotypes are not grounded in fact, courts have forbidden their reinforcement
through the law. See id.
10 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). To illustrate the Court's previously held misconceptions about the role of women in society, Justice Brennan, the
author of the majority opinion in Frontiero, quoted language from a Supreme Court case
decided over one hundred years earlier:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to
say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of woman adopting a distinct and
independent career from that of her husband.... The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Id. at 684-85 (quoting Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872)).
U
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
12 See id. at 2269.
13 See id.
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VMI in almost all respects. 14 In sum, the Court declared that VMI's allmale admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Virginia failed to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding women from VMI 15
and because VWIL
violation.
constitutional
the
remedy
did not adequately
In 1990, a female high school student prompted the United States
Department of Justice to file a complaint against Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's male-only admissions policy violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
At the time the complaint was
filed, VMI and The Citadel in South Carolina stood as the last two remainin, all-male public institutions of higher learning in the United
States.
In response to the complaint, VMI initially asserted that it was
in full compliance with the constitutional standard for single-sex higher
education established by Su preme Court decisions and was therefore not
obligated to admit women.
14
15
16

See id. at 2284.
See id. at 2276.
See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1408 (W.D. Va. 1991). Specifi-

cally, suits proceeded against all of the original named defendants to the lawsuit, including Virginia, Governor Lawrence Douglas Wilder, VMI, its president, superintendent,
the members of its Board of Visitors, and Virginia's State Council of Higher Education
and its members. See id. The State Council of Higher Education and its members were
later dismissed from the lawsuit. See id. Both the VMI Alumni Association and the VMI
Foundation, private organizations, intervened as defendants. See id. Virginia's Governor, Lawrence Douglas Wilder, was granted permission to withdraw from the litigation in
light of his opposition to VMI's male-only admissions policy. See Charles J. Russo &
Susan J. Scollay, All Male State-Funded Military Academies: Anachronism or Necessary
Anomaly?, 82 EDUC. L. REP. 1073, 1074 (West 1993). Similarly, and perhaps due to
outside political pressures, State Attorney General Mary Sue Terry was similarly granted
leave to withdraw. See id. As a result, Virginia was forced to obtain pro bono counsel to
act as its representative. See id.
17 See Valorie K. Vojdik, At War: Narrative Tactics in the Citadel and
VMI Litigation, 19 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 1, 1 (1996). Both The Citadel and VMI offer male cadets
much more than an undergraduate education within a military environment. See id.
Rather, The Citadel and VMI graduates find that they have unlimited access to wealth,
opportunity, and power, particularly in the South. See id. Alumni of both institutions
have reached elevated positions of power within the military, business, and government
sectors. See id.
is See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. Between 1988 and 1990, nearly 350 women
sent test scores, inquiries, and requests for applications to VMI. See Bennett L. Saferstein, Note, Revisiting Plessy at the Virginia Military Institute: Reconciling Single-Sex
Education with Equal Protection, 54 U. PIrr. L. REv. 637, 655 (1993). VMI failed to
respond to any of these women. See id. From the time the complaint was brought, there
was never any doubt as to VMI's status as a state actor for purposes of equal protection
analysis. See id. In fact, because the women of Virginia could not enroll in VMI but had
to support it with their tax dollars, equal protection analysis was clearly triggered. See
id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c-6 (West 1997) (allowing the United States to bring
complaints alleging discrimination in violation of either federal statutes or the United
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Established as a four-year military institution in 1839,19 VMI remained the sole single-sex public institution of higher learning in Vir-

ginia. 20

VMI's unique mission is to mold its students into citizen-

soldiers, instilling in them mental and physical discipline while indoctri-

nating them with a strong moral code.
Unlike the federal military
academies that prepare cadets for service in the various armed forces,
VMI cadets are prepared for both civilian and military life. 22 In fact,
only about fifteen percent of graduating VMI cadets enter into military
service. 23 In order to achieve its goal of producing citizen-soldiers, VMI
employs an adversative, doubt-inducing method modeled after both earStates Constitution). The United States alleged only a constitutional violation because
historically single-sex schools and the military academies are exempt from claims arising
under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act. See Laurie A. Keco, Note, The Citadel: Last
Male Bastion or New Training Ground?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 479, 485 (1996).
Furthermore, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)(4)-(5) (West 1997) provides exemptions for
"educational institution[s] whose primary purpose is the training of individuals for the
military services of the United States" and "public institution[s] of undergraduate higher
education which ...

traditionally and continually from ...

establishment ha[ve] had a

policy of admitting only students of one sex." Id.
19 See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 892 (4th Cir. 1992). Many VMI students and alumni fought in the Civil War, including Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson, a VMI
professor who became notorious as a confederate general. See id. The cadet corps of
VMI fought against union soldiers at New Market, Virginia. See id. A total of about
1800 alumni served in the Civil War. See id. Included among the thousands of alumni
who have fought in other wars is George C. Marshall, General of the Army. See id. at
892-93. A total of six alumni were recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor. See
id. at 893.
20 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269 (1996). Besides VMI, Virginia offers its citizens fifteen other public schools of higher learning. See id. The State
Council of Higher Education for Virginia supervises and coordinates the fifteen public
institutions and VMI. See Virginia, 976 F.2d at 893. The Virginia General Assembly
assigns to the Council of Higher Education numerous responsibilities, including the responsibility to review and either approve or disapprove any potential changes in an institution's mission statement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.6:1(2) (Michie 1993). The General Assembly also delegates to each institution the right to alter or modify its mission and
the right to create admissions criteria. See id.
21 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. It is the declared mission of the school, as stated
by the VMI Board of Visitors' Mission Study Committee:
mo produce educated and honorable men, prepared for the varied work of
civil life, imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of
the American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready as citizensoldiers to defend their country in time of national peril. To accomplish
this result, the Virginia Military Institute shall provide to qualified young
men undergraduate education of highest quality- embracing engineering,
science, and the arts-conducted in, and facilitated by, the unique VMI
system of military discipline.
Virnia, 766 F. Supp. at 1425.
23 See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1432.
See id.
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lier military training and English public schools. 24 This unique and intense pedagogical method is designed to create doubts in the cadets'
minds about previously-held beliefs and experiences and instill in their
place the values that VMI seeks to advance. 25 The adversative method,
also referred to as a process of dissection, 26. is characterized by mental
stress, physical rigor, minute regulation of behavior, an absence of privacy, absolute equality of treatment, and indoctrination of military values. 2 7 The VMI program is composed of six interrelated components that
include the "rat line," the "dyke" system, the class system, the honor
code, the military system, and the barracks life. 28 This intense and
24 See Virginia, 976 F.2d
at 893.
25 See id.
26 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2270.

27 See Virginia, 976 F.2d at 893. In defense of the adversative method,
Colonel N.
Michael Bissell, VMI's Commandant of Cadets, explained the educational process as
follows:
I like to think VMI literally dissects the young student that comes in there,
kind of pulls him apart, and through the stress, everything that goes on in
that environment, would teach him to know everything about himself. He
truly knows how far he can go with his anger, he knows how much he can
take under stress, he knows how much he can take when he is totally tired,
he knows just exactly what he can do when he is physically exhausted, he
fully understands himself and his limits and capabilities. Something I think
is the mainstay of leadership. I think every VMI man that leaves there
knows a great deal about his human capacity to do things under all kinds of
duress and stress.
Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1421-22.
7A See Virginia, 976 F.2d at 893. All entering students are
labeled "rats because the
rat is 'probably the lowest animal on earth.'" Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1422. Generally,
the "rats" are grossly mistreated during the first seven months at VMI. See id. Features
of the "rat line" include egalitarian treatment, indoctrination, frequent punishments, minute regulation of behavior, and the use of privileges to enhance desirable behavior. See
id. The "rat line" has been proven to be more stressful and more dramatic than Army
basic training or Army boot camp. See id. It is comparable, however, to boot camp in
the Marine Corps in terms of the mental and physical stress of the experience. See id.
The "rats" are punished and rewarded collectively as well as individually, wherein a
sense of "class solidarity in addition to individual responsibility" is established. Id.
Upon completion, those who survive the "rat line" feel a sense of accomplishment and a
strong bond to their fellow sufferers. See id.
VMI's class system is one of privileges and responsibilities assigned to classes of cadets and aimed at developing their character and cultivating leadership. See id. Based on
rank, each class has specifically outlined responsibilities. See id. The seniors' responsibilities, for example, include providing general leadership to the "rats," writing the operating procedures for the following year's "rat line," supervising the breakout of the
"rats," and being a "dyke," or a mentor, to a "rat." See id. at 1422-23. The sophomores, to cite another example, are responsible for acting as the disciplinarians of the
"rats." See id. at 1423. Through peer pressure within the class system, upper-class cadets teach new cadets-who have been stripped of their old behaviors and values within
the "rat line"-the behaviors and values VMI seeks to instill in them. See id. Overall,
the class system provides constant supervision of new cadets, tutoring, and the disburse-
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unique program for which VMI is well known has notably produced a
great number of leaders since its establishment in 1839-men who 2ive
full credit to VMI for both their personal and professional successes.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
conducted a six-day trial to determine whether VMI's male-only admissions policy passed constitutional muster under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 3 0 After hearing the testimony of various
ment of punishment and privileges by which to mold the cadets. See id.
The "dyke system," which is similar to the class system, provides some relief to the
"rats" from the rigors and stress of the "rat line." See id. A first classman is assigned
to each individual "rat" to act as a mentor, or a "dyke," to that "rat." See id. The dyke
system contributes to the creation of loyalty between the "rats" and between the classes
of cadets, while at the same time providing a model for support and leadership. See id.
The VMI honor code is ever-present in all aspects of institutional life. See id. The
honor code states that a cadet "'does not lie, cheat, steal nor tolerate those who do.'" Id.
Any violation of the honor code automatically results in expulsion. See id. The code is
strictly enforced by an honor court made up of cadets chosen from the two upper classes.
See id.
Barracks life is a unique, central, and crucial aspect of the VMI experience. See id.
All cadets must live in the barracks throughout all four years at VMI. See id. Within the
barracks occur inspections, administration of both the class system and the honor system,
the "rat-dyke" relationship, and a large part of the new cadet training, including the "rat
line." See id. Barracks life diminishes cadets to the lowest common denominator, allowing for the slow transformation of values, attitudes, and behaviors to be instilled in cadets
year after year. See id. Since no professional member of the staff lives in the barracks
with the cadets, it is the cadets' responsibility to provide support for life in the barracks.
See id. The barracks is composed of four floors, with each class occupying one floor.
See id. at 1423-24. Each cadet room holds an average of 3.7 cadets. See id. at 1424.
There exists throughout the barracks an absolute lack of privacy. See id. A cadet is exposed at all times, since there is no area in the barracks that physically affords even a
small amount of privacy. See id. There are no curtains or window shades in the cadets'
rooms, no locks on doors, and even the batrooms are no retreat for a cadet searching for
solitude. See id. The doors in the barracks contain open windows that allow the officer
in charge to check in any room at any time and see what any cadet is doing at that time.
See id. The conditions within the barracks (i.e., poor ventilation, unappealing furniture,
lack of privacy) are purposefully set up to induce stress. See id. VMI is the only institution that places such an intense emphasis on the barracks life. See id. As one of VMI's
expert witnesses explained, "[piroducing a VMI graduate without the barracks experience
would be equivalent to dressing someone up in the uniform of a Marine without first
sending them [sic] to boot camp." Id. at 1423.
The military aspect of VMI, which provides etiquette, regulation, and drill, is a
dominant aspect of the VMI experience. See id. at 1424. Each entering student is required to participate in any one of the four ROTC programs throughout his four years at
VMI. See id. The ROTC programs operate independently of VMI's "rat line," class
system, "dyke system," and barracks system. See id.
See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2269. Among VMI's alumni are members of Congress,
military leaders, and business executives. See id. The alumni of VMI possess a strong
sense of loyalty that is reflected in the fact that the school's endowment is the largest perstudent endowment of all undergraduate schools in the United States. See id.
30 See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1408. The United States asserted that VMI could
not
continue as a state-supported institution and continue to exclude women. See id. VMI
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expert witnesses, the court concluded that VMI's exclusion of women
was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 3 1 The court commenced its analysis of the gender discrimination claim by reviewing the
first challenge to sex discrimination in higher education in Virginia,32
Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.33 In that
case, the court found that the all-male admissions policy of the University
of Virginia in Charlottesville violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause; the court was unwilling, however, to require Virginia
to desegregate all of its learning institutions because it was unprepared to
force Virginia's sole military school, VMI, to admit women. 34
Next, the VMI court looked for guidance to the Supreme Court's
decision in Mississippi University of Women v. Hogan, wherein the
Court found that a state nursing school's all-female admissions policy
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.3
The
responded by claiming that its discrimination against women was not invidious but rather
promoted the legitimate state interest of creating diversity within Virginia's educational
system. See id. All parties agreed that the proper level of review should be garnered
from other cases dealing with higher education. See id. at 1409. The district court then
outlined decisions wherein the Supreme Court deferred to the judgment of universities in
making their own academic decisions. See id. The court explained that although universities enjoy the fundamental freedom to decide who may be admitted, such freedom is
not absolute. See id. The district court then observed that in cases where the discretionary academic decisions of individual institutions have had the effect of fostering unconstitutional discrimination, courts have stepped in and overruled the institutions' decisionmaking powers. See id.
31 See id. at 1408. Nineteen witnesses testified, including one expert on
human
physiology, one expert on college facilities, and four experts on education. See id.
32 See id. at 1409.
33 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
34 See id. at 187. The court in Kirstein explained its position by declaring:
We are urged to go further and to hold that Virginia may not operate any
educational institution separated according to the sexes. We decline to do
so. Obvious problems beyond our capacity to decide on this record readily
occur. One of Virginia's educational institutions is military in character.
Are women to be admitted on an equal basis, and, if so, are they to wear
uniforms and be taught to bear arms?
Id. In assessing the constitutionality of VMI's admissions policy, the district court also
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Willians v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C.
1970). See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410. In Williams, male students sought to be
admitted into the all-female Winthrop College in South Carolina. See Williams, 316 F.
Supp. at 135. Because there was no aspect of Winthrop College that made it unique,
other than its single-sex status, the Williams court found that the plaintiffs' interest in attending college in the same town in which they lived was not sufficiently compelling to
declare a constitutional violation. See id. at 138. The Williams court gave great deference to education experts who proclaimed that "'a single-sex institution can advance the
quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon areas of primary interest
to only one sex.'" Id. at 137 (citation omitted).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
36 See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1410; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731, 733; see also
infra
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court, however, quickly found a number of distinctions that differentiated
the VMI case from the Hogan decision. 37 The most striking difference,
the court noted, was that Mississippi's rationale for remedying past discrimination against women in the nursing field was neither an important
government interest nor was the school's all-female admissions policy a
substantially-related means of advancing that interest. Conversely, the
court recognized that Virginia's aim of promoting diversity in higher
education was an important government interest that could only be advanced by maintaining VMI as a single-gender institution.
The district court further acknowledged that "[a] substantial body of
'exceedingly persuasive' evidence" supported the theory that both male
and female students benefit greatly from attending single-gender learning
institutions. 39 In light of the experts' findings favoring single-gender
education, the court declared that the VMI Board of Visitors was wholly
justified in its decision to maintain VMI as an all-male institution. 4° Although the court acknowledged the expert testimony that established that
notes 109-113 and accompanying text (discussing Hogan).
37 See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411. The district court noted that the admission of
men into the nursing school in Hogan was found not to affect the teaching style, nor did it
affect the female students' classroom performance. See id. The court further posited that
the VMI situation was essentially different from Hogan in that the admission of women
into VMI would force the institution to alter its educational system fundamentally. See id.
In effect, the court declared that the goals of VMI's system would inevitably be thwarted.
See id.
38 See id. In Hogan, Mississippi asserted that maintaining the nursing
school as an
all-fenude institution was a form of justifiable affirmative action to compensate women for
past discrimination. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727. The Hogan Court rejected Mississippi's justification and held that promoting affirmative action for women in the nursing
field was not an important government objective; therefore, keeping the nursing school
all-female was not a substantially related means of advancing that objective. See id. at
727, 730.
In the VMI case, however, the district court explained that "[tihe sole way to attain
single-gender diversity is to maintain a policy of admitting only one gender to an institution." Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411. The district court further noted that unlike the
plaintiff in Hogan, who would have had to commute outside of his community to attend
another nursing school if he was not admitted to the Mississippi University for Women,
no such problem existed in VMI because students must live on campus for all four
years-thereby eliminating the close-to-home advantage that was a contributing factor in
Hogan. See id.
See Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1411-12. The court reiterated the experts' findings
that for those students who benefit from single-sex education, the opportunity to attend
such an institution is valuable and likely to contribute significantly to their academic and
professional successes. See id. at 1412.
40 See id. The district court gave great deference to the Virginia
Legislature's determination that providing this unique, single-sex educational opportunity for men was
more important than offering an education to both genders. See id. The court further
observed that the VMI Board's decision to maintain the school's all-male status was reinforced because VMI would undergo significant changes if it admitted women, specifically
changes in living conditions and methods of instruction. See id.
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some women would be mentally and physically able to undergo VMI's
rigorous system, the court stopped short of requiring the admission of
women because the court determined that a coeducational college would
be considerably different from a male-only college. 41 The court further
found that the introduction of even one woman into the VMI process
would substantially change it, such that the very experience the woman
was seeking would no longer exist. 42 The material changes that VMI
would be forced to undergo, the court stated, provided sufficient constitutional support for maintaining a single-gender school. 43 Thus, the district court concluded that Virginia's objective of diversifying the state's
educational system was legitimate; the only way to meet this objective
was to continue to exclude women from the VMI program. 44
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling. 45 The appellate court first declared that the trial court was justified in finding that the admission of
women into VMI would inevitably alter its unique educational program,
particularly with respect to three crucial aspects: (1) the adversative
system, (2) the absence of privacy, and (3) the physical training regimen. 46 The court then acknowledged that because men and women are
41

See id. The court deferred to expert findings that indicated that the presence of

women within the classroom would not only distract the male students and increase dating
pressures, but would also impair the "esprit de corps" and the egalitarian atmosphere that
constitute the VMI experience. See id. Furthermore, the court stated, arrangements
would need to be made for personal privacy, windows would need to be covered, doors
would need to be locked, and the entire adversative method would need to be altered.
See id. at 1412-13. Pointing to one expert's testimony, the court prophesized that in order to accommodate women, the adversative method would ultimately be dropped and
replaced with a more nurturing and supportive system. See id. at 1413.
42 See id. at 1414.
43 See id. at 1413.
44 See id. at 1415. The district court hinted that the real issue was whether Virginia
must also support an all-female learning institution or whether it could continue to expect
private colleges to provide women with single-sex education. See id. at 1414-15. That
issue, the court recognized, was not before the court and therefore did not need to be decided at that time. See id. at 1415. The district judge explained:
VMI is a different type of institution. It has set its eye on the goal of ciizen-solider [sic] and never veered from the path it has chosen to meet that
goal. VMI truly marches to the beat of a different drummer, and I will
permit it to continue to do so.
Id.
45 See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 900 (4th Cir. 1992). The United
States argued on appeal that offering a unique single-sex education to men for the sole
reason of enhancing diversity was not a legitimate government objective and that neither
VMI nor Virginia had established sufficient justification for the exclusion of women. See
id. at 892.
46 See id. at 896-97.

The court of appeals stated that admitting women would force
VMI to convert to a dual system of physical training in order for women to undergo a
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physiologically and psychologically different, single-gender education is
pedagogically justifiable and beneficial. 47 Nonetheless, the court ex-

plained that this finding failed to answer the more significant question
whether Virginia could deny to women the unique benefits offered by
VMI under the guise of diversity."
The circuit court answered this question in the negative and declared

that the state's policy of promoting diversity within its educational system
could not favor one gender over the other. Virginia, the court asserted,
failed to explain adequately why it offered the benefits of a VMI-type

education to men only. 50 The court therefore concluded that in order to
comply with the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro-

tection Clause, Virginia must choose between any one of the following
three options: (1) admit women and adjust the program accordingly, (2)

establish a parallel institution or program for women, or (3) abandon
state funding of VMI and leave it as a private institution with the freedom
to follow its own admissions policy. 5 The circuit court then remanded
regime that would in effect be equal to that of men; nevertheless, both male and female
cadets would perceive such a dual system as unequal and ultimately feel resentment and
jealousy. See id. at 896. All parties to the litigation, along with the court, agreed that
VMI would also be forced to undergo some type of change in order to make accommodations for the privacy of female cadets. See id. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence supported the lower court's finding that cross-sexual confrontation and the deliberate harassment that is a part of the rigorous training (specifically within the "rat" system)
would add additional elements of distraction and stress to VMI's methodology. See id.
47 See id. at 897. As support for this proposition, the
district court deferred to a
study that found that single-gender colleges have numerous advantages over coeducational colleges:

Single-sex colleges show a pattern of effects on both sexes that is almost
uniformly positive. Students of both sexes become more academically involved, interact with faculty frequently, show large increases in intellectual
self-esteem, and are more satisfied with practically all aspects of college

experience (the sole exception is social life) compared with their counterparts in coeducational institutions.

Id. (citation omitted). A similar study cited by the district court demonstrated that students from single-sex colleges were more likely to ignore stereotypical job aspirations and

favor more sex-neutral occupations. See id. The district court acknowledged the study's
conclusion that there was no support for the theory that coeducation effectively alters the
imbalance in the career goals of academically superior female and male undergraduates.
See id.
See id. at 898. The appellate court recognized that while VMI's methodology justified a single-sex environment, Virginia had never explained why this opportunity was
offered only to males. See id. The court further contended that because the VMI program depended upon "single-genderedness" rather than "maleness," an all-female VMIlike institution could be adjusted to accommodate male and female differences without
detrimental effects. See id.
49 See id. at 899.
so See id.
51 See Virginia, 976 F.2d at 900.
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the case to the district court with orders to oversee 52the formulation,
adoption, and implementation of Virginia's chosen plan.
Virginia responded to the Fourth Circuit's ruling by proposing a
corresponding program for women, the Virginia Women's Institute for
Leadership (VWIL).53 Mary Baldwin College, a private school for
women, was chosen as the location for the state's newly established fouryear undergraduate program that would initially admit approximately
twenty-five to thirty women. Although VWIL was founded on the idea
of fulfilling the same mission as VMI-producing citizen-soldiersVWIL's program differed from VMI's with respect to its methods of
education, financial resources, and academic offerings. 55 Upon returning
to the district court with its newly proposed program, Virginia was
granted approval to maintain two separate single-gender institutions. 56
In adopting the VWIL program, the district court initially recognized that substantial disagreement existed between the parties concerning
the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause and the instructions of
the Fourth Circuit. 57 Specifically, the court dismissed the notion that the
Fourth Circuit's ruling required Virginia to establish a "separate but
equal" program for women and exglained that such a task would be both
The court then shifted its attention
impracticable and unconstitutional.
52 See id.

Following the Fourth Circuit's decision, the United States filed a petition

for rehearing with the suggestion for a rehearing en banc. See id. After taking a poll of
the court on the issue of rehearing the case en banc, a majority of the court voted to deny
the rehearing. See id.
53 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2272 (1996).
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 485 (W.D. Va. 1994).
57 See id. at 473. The United States posited that the Fourth Circuit and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause both mandated that if Virginia established a
parallel program for women, it must be nothing less than a "mirror image" of the VMI
program. See id. Absent that, the United States maintained that the only constitutional
remedy was to allow women to attend VMI. See id.at 473 n.2. Virginia, on the other
hand, posited that the instructions of the Fourth Circuit required the state to establish an
all-female program that would provide women with an education comparable to that obtained by VMI students. See id.at 473. Thus, Virginia argued that attaining the same
outcome for women did not necessarily require the all-female program to become the
"mirror image" of VMI. See id. Furthermore, Virginia asserted that its proposed program at VWIL comported with the Equal Protection Clause and satisfied the intermediate
scrutiny test as applied in prior gender discrimination cases. See id.
58 See id.at 475. The district court decided that in light of the decision in Sweatt v.
Painter,the Fourth Circuit could not have meant for Virginia to establish a "separate but
equal" institution for women. See id.(citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)); see
infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Sweatt decision). In Sweatt, the
Supreme Court concluded that within the context of educational institutions, it is impossible to establish a "separate but equal" school because a new school cannot possibly

1997]

WOMEN WIN THE WAR AT VMI

to VWIL in order to determine whether Virginia's pro osed plan complied with the Fourth Circuit's remanding instructions.
The court deferred to Virginia's educational experts who determined that the training
methods and resources to be used in VWIL, although different from
VMI, would produce similar outcomes for women as those that VMI

produced for men. 60 The district court explained that both Virginia's

policy of diversity and its limited resources precluded the state from establishing identical curricula throughout its colleges. 6' Although the district court acknowledged that some women would be successful within
VMI's adversative program, it proffered that the Equal Protection Clause
did not require Virginia to implement a "mirror image" of VMI's program at VWIL. 62 It was sufficient and wholly justified, the court pro-

nounced, for Virginia to provide a program such as VWIL for women,
not based on stereotypes about men and women, but based on legitimate

pedagogical differences between the sexes.

The district court was

therefore satisfied that Virginia had met the Fourth Circuit's mandate of

implementing a corresponding program for women grounded on the
needs and differences of each gender. In approving Virginia's proposed
plan, the court asserted that "[i]f VMI marches to the beat of a drum,

then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and65when the march
is over, both will have arrived at the same destination."

possess certain intangible qualities such as reputation, tradition, prestige, and history.
See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34.
59 See Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 476.
60 See id. The Dean of Mary Baldwin College set up a task force comprised of
leaders and experts in the design and implementation of women's educational programs. See
id. The task force was charged with creating a four-year leadership program exclusively
for women. See id. After extensively researching and studying different methods by
which to train women for leadership roles, the task force concluded that VMI's military
model, specifically its adversative method, was inappropriate for the education and training of most women. See id. One expert opined that not only would the adversative
method be ineffective for most women, but it would be counter-productive because most
women prior to entering college generally have lower self-esteem and confidence than
men. See id. Therefore, in place of the adversative method, the experts proposed a cooperative method that would reinforce women's self-esteem. See id.
61 See id. at 477. The district court stated that each individual college in Virginia
could not possibly "be all things to all people." Id. The court explained that Virginia's
financial resources did not allow such a result nor did the Equal Protection Clause require
it. See id.
62 See id. at481.
63 See id.
64 See id.

65 Virginia, 852 F. Supp. at 484. Although the district court approved of Virginia's
plan, it acknowledged that because VWIL was a new venture, no one could accurately
predict its outcome. See id. Based on the evidence, however, the court felt that there
was sufficient reason to believe that the program would be successful in achieving its
goals. See id.Citing one of Virginia's experts, the court proclaimed that, conceptually,
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On appeal, a divided United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.
The court determined
that application of the traditional two-prong intermediate scrutiny test required taking the additional step of inquiring into the "substantive comparability" of both the VMI and VWIL programs.
The court first recognized that providing single-gender education to its citizens was an
important and legitimate government interest." The circuit court then
determined that the only way to realize the state's objective of providing
single-gender education was to exclude one gender.
Thus, the court
agreed that the exclusion of women from VMI was directly related to
obtaining the desired results provided by the adversative method. 70 The
court further opined that placing men and women together into the adversative environment would destroy "any sense
of decency that still per71

meates the relationship between the sexes."

The court next evaluated the programs offered at VMI and VWIL to
determine whether both provided benefits comparable in substance,
though not comparable in form and detail. 7 After comparing both prothe VWIL program was fully developed and could be implemented for the 1995 school
year although it would necessitate further adjustments over time. See id.
67 See United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir. 1995).
67 See id. at 1237. The circuit court explained that in order to achieve equal treatment of the laws under the Equal Protection Clause:
mhe alternatives left available to each gender by a classification based on
homogeneity of gender need not be the same, but they must be substantively comparable so that, in the end, we cannot conclude that the value of
the benefits provided by the state to one gender tends, by comparison to
the benefits provided to the other, to lessen the dignity, respect, or societal
regard of the other gender.
Id. Thus, the "special" intermediate scrutiny test that the circuit court applied included
determining whether (1) Virginia's objective of providing for its citizens a single-sex educational opportunity was an important and legitimate government objective, (2) the gender
classification adopted by Virginia was substantially and directly related to that objective,
and (3) the mutual exclusion of men and women from each other's institutions left open
the opportunity for those excluded to gain comparable benefits at their respective institutions or through other state-sponsored means. See id.
68 See id. at 1238. The circuit court deferred to the experts from the lower court who
testified that single-gender education greatly benefits both sexes at the college level. See
id. at 1239. Recognizing, however, that some disagreement exists among experts about
the degree to which single-gender education benefits men and women, the circuit court
stated that it was not the court's responsibility to resolve that issue. See id. The circuit
court found it sufficient that a growing consensus exists within the professional community that a "sexually homogeneous environment yields concrete educational benefits." Id.
See id. at 1239.
70 See id. The court explained that the most direct means for the state to provide
single-gender education within a military environment was to exclude women from VMI
and men from VWIL. See id.
71 Id.

72 See Virginia, 44 F.3d at 1240.

Using "substantive comparability" as an analysis
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grams, the court concluded that the missions, goals, and results of both
institutions would be substantially similar regardless of how the methods
of achieving these results would differ. 75 Lastly, the court announced
that it would retain the district court's jurisdiction in order for the lower
court to oversee Virginia's continued involvement in VWIL, both financially and as supervisor of the program.7 4 Following this decision, the
standard, the court determined that both programs satisfied this model. See id. at 124041. The court then asserted that the alternative to allowing states to provide benefits to
their citizens only when such benefits could be provided in an identical fashion to all citizens-regardless of whether the citizens are similarly situated-is only justified by a
baseless and needless demand for conformity. See id. at 1240.
73 See id. at 1240. The court explained that while VMI employs the
adversative
method within a military regime, VWIL proposed to employ a structured environment
with some military training and a heavy concentration on leadership development. See id.
at 1240-41. This difference in methodology, the court noted, was the result of a professional judgment concerning the best way to provide the same opportunities and achieve
the same results for women at VWIL. See id. at 1241. Although the court acknowledged
that a VWIL degree would lack the prestige and historical benefit of a VMI degree, it was
satisfied that with long-term commitment from Virginia, these intangible factors would
develop over time. See id. The court further reasoned that men and women were not
limited to the programs of VMI and VWIL because Virginia provides numerous other
opportunities in higher education, including Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, which provides a coeducational military program. See id.
74 See id. at 1242. The court instructed the district court to oversee the implementation of the VWIL program with instructions to ensure that (1) the program's administrator
was well qualified and highly motivated, (2) the program was well promoted and attracted
potentially qualified applicants, (3) the state continued to fund the program adequately in
the future, and (4) the program was regularly reviewed by professional educators who
would adjust it as necessary in order to continue providing a program that not only offered a valuable bachelor's degree, but one that simultaneously taught discipline and produced women leaders. See id.
Senior Circuit Judge Phillips, author of the dissenting opinion, announced that Virginia's proposed plan did not bring the state into compliance with the guarantees of the
Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 1242-43 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent was
therefore wiling to reject the State's proposed plan, to declare VMI's admissions policy
unconstitutional, and to order VMI either to abandon its policy or forego further support
from the State. See id. at 1243 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips declared that
Virginia's proposal to create VWIL did not survive the intermediate scrutiny test. See id.
In fact, the judge continued, if the state were required to provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for VMI's policy, Virginia's actual purpose would be revealed:
[Nlot to create a new type of educational opportunity for women, nor to
broaden the Commonwealth's educational base for producing a special
kind of citizen-soldier leadership, nor to further diversify the Commonwealth's higher education system... but [simply to allow] VMI to continue to exclude women in order to preserve its historic character and mission.
Id. at 1247 (Phillips, J., dissenting). The dissent further suggested that Virginia's policy
of supporting VMI could withstand constitutional muster if the state simultaneously supported single-gender institutions with substantially comparable programs, physical plant,
funding, faculty, administration, support services, and library resources, provided that
there did not exist gender-based discrimination with respect to tangible and intangible
benefits. See id. at 1250 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge Phillips contended that there
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United States's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied by the Fourth
Circuit. 7 5

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari .6 Writing for
the majority, Justice Ginsburg proclaimed that the unique educational opmust not be any stigmatic implications emerging from the content of the educational programs. See id. Thus, because the proposed arrangement fell short of providing substantially similar intangible and tangible educational benefits to both sexes, the dissent declared that the contrast between the two institutions on all the relevant characteristics was
so obvious that it did not merit a detailed recitation. See id. The judge consequently
concluded that even if the VWIL program fulfilled its expectations within a short period
of time, it would only be a "pale shadow" of VMI and was therefore not worthy of comparison. See id.
75 See United States v. Virginia, 52 F.3d 90, 91 (4th Cir. 1995).
Upon request to
take a poll as to whether to rehear the case en banc, the circuit court denied a rehearing.
See id. Judge Motz, joined by Judges Hall, Murnaghan, and Michael, authored a separate dissent in which the judge expressed disagreement with the decision to deny a rehearing en banc. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz commenced the dissent by reminding the court that over forty years ago, the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to
provide a "separate but equal" education to African American students. See id. The
judge noted that despite that holding, the court was now allowing Virginia to provide a
separate, and concededly unequal, education to women. See id. Judge Motz then added
that the constitutional standard applied by the circuit court was both confused and contrary to logic and law. See id. at 91-92 (Motz, J., dissenting). The judge noted that in
Hogan, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that a state could constitutionally justify
providing single-gender education to students simply because the school was itself a single-gender institution. See id. at 92 (Motz, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). Thus, the dissent explained, the first prong of
the test-whether Virginia was advancing a legitimate and important objective by supporting an all-male institution- failed because "simply providing single-gender education
cannot constitute a state's legitimate and important objective for excluding one gender
from a state-financed institution." Id. The judge further recognized that the state had not
shown an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its male-only admissions policy because the evidence had not demonstrated that keeping VMI all-male was necessary to
further its mission to produce citizen-soldiers. See id.
There exists no evidence, the judge proffered, that the adversative method was essential to the VMI program. See id. at 92-93 (Motz, J., dissenting). Assuming, however,
that adversative training was an essential aspect of the VMI program, Judge Motz proclaimed that the VWIL program, which did not include the adversative method, could
never be "substantively comparable" to VMI. See id. at 93 (Motz, J., dissenting). The
judge further argued that if VWIL's program was truly comparable to that of VMI, then
the adversative method must not be a very critical aspect of VMI's program. See id.
Based upon this reasoning, the judge concluded that there was nothing to prevent the dissolution of the adversative method and the admission of women into VMI. See id.
The judge inquired as to how a "degree from a yet to be implemented supplemental
program at Mary Baldwin [could] be held 'substantively comparable' to a degree from a
venerable Virginia military institution that was established more than 150 years ago?" Id.
The judge acknowledged that pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, women need not
necessarily be guaranteed equal results, but must be guaranteed an equal opportunity to
strive for such results. See id. Because that opportunity had been categorically denied to
women, the dissent concluded, Virginia had violated women's equal protection rights.
See id.
76 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995).
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portunities at VMI reserved exclusively for men denied to qualified
women the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Justice explained that because Virginia had not set

forth an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the exclusion of
women from VMI, such exclusion was an outright violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 73 The Court also asserted that Virginia's proposed
plan of establishing the VWIL program exclusively for women at Mary
Baldwin College did not remedy the constitutional violation because it
failed 79to provide the same opportunity that the state afforded to men at
VMI.

The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of segregated educational institutions in 1950 in the landmark case of Sweatt v.
Painter. In Sweatt, the Court was asked to compare two racially segregated institutions of higher learning in order to determine whether the
state's segregation policy withstood constitutional muster. 8 ' Declaring
both institutions to be substantially unequal, the Court compelled the

University of Texas Law School, a renowned whites-only school, to accept the black plaintiff seeking admission into the program.8 2 The Court
recognized that in terms of both the physical and intangible factors that
contribute to the greatness of a law school, the University of Texas Law

77 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2269
(1996).
78 See id.at 2287.
79 See id. at 2286-87.

so 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950).
91 See id. at 632. Plaintiff, a black applicant seeking to be admitted to the University
of Texas Law School, brought suit when his application was rejected solely because of
his race. See id. at 631. At the time the suit was instituted, there existed no law school
in Texas that admitted black applicants. See id. Although a state trial court recognized
that in denying the plaintiff's application for admission the state had violated his equal
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court did not compel the school to
admit the plaintiff. See id. at 631-32. Instead, the trial court continued the case for another six months in order to permit the state to establish substantially equal facilities for
black applicants. See id. at 632.
At the end of the six-month period, the trial court decided to deny the plaintiff's request to be admitted to the University of Texas Law School because the state had adopted
a plan to open a law school for black applicants within the upcoming months. See id.
Although the new school was soon made available to the plaintiff, he refused to register
and instead waited for his appeal to be heard. See id. A state court of appeals set aside
the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. See id. On
remand, the trial court compared the newly instituted school for blacks with the University of Texas Law School and found that the new school offered the plaintiff the advantages, privileges, and opportunities to study the law in a manner substantially equivalent
to that provided to white students attending the University of Texas. See id. The trial
court therefore denied the plaintiff relief and the state court of appeals affirmed. See id.
82 See id.
at 633, 636.
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School was superior to the newly established blacks-only law school.
The Court further proclaimed that the all-black law school could not be
an effective legal training ground because it isolated its students from
members of other racial groups with whom the students would be interacting once they became members of the Texas Bar.8 4 Lastly, the Court
deemed it irrelevant that only a small number of black applicants had
sought admission into the all-white law school. As the Court explained,
equal protection rights are personal
in nature and must be protected even
85
in the case of a single violation.
The idea that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be extended beyond race to include gender within its
shield of guaranteed protections originated in 1971 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Reed v. Reed. s 6 In Reed, the Court, for the first
time, implicitly departed from the rational basis analysis traditionally
applied to gender-based classifications and shifted to a higher level of
scrutiny.8 7 In so doing, the Court invalidated a section of an Idaho stat-

See id. at 633-34. The Court explained that the educational and professional opportunities available to white students at the University of Texas Law School far exceeded
those available to black students at the all-black school. See id. at 633. The Court observed:
In terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for
83

specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of

law review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is
superior. What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such
qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience
of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige.
Id. at 633-34. The Court proclaimed that an individual with the freedom to choose between the two law schools would not consider the choice to be a close one. See id. at
634. In addition, the Court noted, no student would choose to study law in an academic
vacuum far removed from the exchange of ideas and views between other students. See
id.
84 See id. at 634. Recognizing that non-black racial groups make up about 85%
of
the Texas population-including the majority of lawyers, jurors, and judges-the Court
declared it substantially unequal to exclude from the all-black law school such a significant and substantial segment of society. See id.
See id. at 635.
96 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). The Reed Court took a significant step toward incorporating gender-based discrimination into the guarantees of the Constitution and established the
intermediate scrutiny level of review as the method with which to analyze gender-based
classifications. See Ides, supra note 4, at 41. Furthermore, by incorporating this new
gender-based discrimination doctrine into the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause and in applying the intermediate scrutiny test to gender discrimination, the Court
in effect created new fundamental law. See id.
87 See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76-77; see also Taylor, supra note 6, at 399.
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ute that provided that men must be preferred over equally qualified
women to administer a decedent's estate.88
The Court first explained that because Idaho's statute provided for
different treatment of men and women based solely on the basis of sex,
the classification was subject to equal protection scrutiny. s9 Although the
Court acknowledged that the statute's purpose was legitimate-to reduce
the workload on probate courts by automatically eliminating one class of
persons over another- the Court held that this rationale could not justify
After balancing the competing interests,
a gender-based classification.
of gender discrimination against
the
burden
the Court determined that
women outweighed the benefit of a lighter workload for the probate
courts. 91 Therefore, the Court concluded that by providing different
violated
treatment for similarly situated men and women, Idaho's statute
92
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The rationale for the Supreme Court's decision in Reed was extended two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson.93 The Court in Frontiero was asked to consider the constitutionality of statutes that provided,
solely for administrative convenience, that female members of the uniformed services could not claim their husbands as dependents unless the
husbands were in fact dependent upon their wives for over one-half of
their support. 94 Male service members, on the other hand, could auto-

88

See Reed, 404 U.S. at 72-73, 77.

Plaintiff Sally Reed sought to be appointed as

administratix of her deceased son's estate. See id. at 71-72. The boy's father, Cecil
Reed, subsequently filed a competing petition in order that the court appoint him administrator of the estate. See id. at 72. Following a joint hearing on both petitions, the probate
court held that the Idaho Probate Code mandated Cecil Reed be appointed as administrator of the estate for the sole reason that he was a man. See id. Sally Reed then appealed
the probate court's order to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho,
which held that both applicable sections of Idaho's Code violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 73. The district court remanded the matter
back to the probate court to determine which of the two Reeds was better qualified to act
as administrator of the estate. See id. at 74. Before this determination was made, however, Cecil Reed appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. See id. That court subsequently
reversed the district court's order and reinstated the probate court's original order in favor of Cecil Reed. See id. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the state's
statutory preference of males was mandatory and left no room for a probate court's exercise of discretion. See id.
8 See id. at 75.
See id. at 76.
91

See id. at 76-77.

92 See id. at 77.
93 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973).
94 See id. at 678-79. Claiming the spouse as the dependent of a member of the uniformed services entitles a couple to receive increased quarters allowances along with
comprehensive medical and dental benefits. See id. at 678.
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matically claim their wives as dependents regardless of whether the95wives

were in fact dependent upon the husbands for any of their support.
The Court commenced its analysis by acknowledging the prolonged

and unfortunate history of gender-based discrimination in the United
States.9 6 Recognizing that the plaintiff's claim was brought under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as opposed to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court nonetheless
utilized Reed as its guide to establish that gender-based classifications are
inherently suspect and are therefore subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny. 97 Although the Court failed to articulate how it applied that standard of review, it declared the statutes to be unconstitutional because they
encouraged different treatment for similarly situated men and women.

The Court rejected the government's argument that the statutory scheme
saved both time and money because the government failed to produce any
concrete evidence to support this assertion. 99 Frontiero proclaimed that

whenever a statutory scheme draws a sharp and distinct line between men

95 See id. at 678.

Plaintiff Sharron Frontiero, a United States Air Force lieutenant,
brought suit when her application seeking to claim her husband as her dependent was
denied. See id. at 680. Plaintiffs application was denied because she failed to demonstrate that her husband was in fact dependent on her for over 50 % of his support. See id.
Plaintiff and her spouse alleged that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated on the
basis of gender in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that the statutes were discriminatory in two respects:
[Fjirst, as a procedural matter, a female member is required to demonstrate
her spouse's dependency, while no such burden is imposed upon male
members; and, second, as a substantive matter, a male member who does
not provide more than one-half of his wife's support receives benefits,
while a similarly situated female member is denied such benefits.

Id.

96 See id. at 684.
97 See id. at 680, 688.
98 See id. at 690-91. The Court rejected the government's argument that, as a practical matter, wives are frequently dependent upon their husbands and husbands are rarely
dependent upon their wives. See id. at 688-89.
99 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 689. The Court added that "although efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some importance, 'the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.'" Id. at 690 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). The Court further commented that one way for the
statutes to withstand strict judicial scrutiny would be for the government to demonstrate
that it was in fact cheaper to grant the benefits to all male service members than it was to
identify which male members were actually entitled to the benefits. See id. at 689. Because there was substantial evidence, the Court continued, that many of the spouses of
male members would in fact not qualify for the benefits if they were put to the test, the
government's justification inevitably failed. See id. at 689-90. Upon entering the realm
of strict scrutiny, the Court declared, "there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality." Id. at
690 (citations omitted).
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and women solely to achieve administrative convenience, it partakes in an
arbitrary and constitutionally-forbidden legislative undertaking.l°°
In the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren, 10 1 the United States Supreme
Court finally articulated the precise test to use when analyzing genderbased classifications under the intermediate level of review. 102 The Court
in Craig declared unconstitutional a statute that prohibited the sale of
beer to females under the age of eighteen and to males under the age of
twenty-one.I13 As in Frontiero,the Craig Court commenced its analysis
by relying on the precedent established in Reed, which dictated that gender-based classifications must be subject to scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 104 The Court then defined what
is known today as the intermediate level of review: "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 105 In applying this
test, the Court held that government traffic safety statistics indicating that
young men are more prone to drink and drive than young women were
insufficient to justify the gender-based classification. 106 As the Court
explained, the government also failed to demonstrate that gender constituted a legitimate and accurate proxy for the state's prohibition of drink-

100
101

See id.
at 690.

429 U.S. 190 (1976).

102 See id. at 197.
103 See id. at 192.

The complaint was brought by both a male between 18 and 21

years of age and a licensed vendor of beer. See id. Plaintiffs alleged that the genderbased classification constituted invidious discrimination against men between the ages of
17 and 21, and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the young man's claim was rendered moot
because he had already turned 21 years of age and he was only seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief. See id. The Court, however, was able to proceed with the licensed
vendor's claim that relied upon the equal protection claims of males between the ages of
18 and 21. See id.
104

See id. at 197.

105 Id.
106 See id.at 200. The government introduced a number of statistical surveys indicating that males between the ages of 18 and 21 were arrested more frequently for driving
while intoxicated than were females within that same age group. See id. Similarly, other
statistics demonstrated that among those youths between the ages of 17 and 21 that were
injured or killed in traffic accidents, the number of males exceeded that of females. See
id.at 200-01. Another survey indicated that young males were more likely to drink beer
and drive than their female counterparts. See id. at 201. Upon analyzing these surveys,
the Court determined that overall such statistics were insufficient to justify this type of
gender-based classification. See id. The Court further proffered "that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one that inevitably is in
tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at
204.
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ing and driving. ° 7 Finding that the nexus between traffic safety and
gender was too tenuous to fulfill Reed's requirement that a gender-based
classification be substantially related to a government objective, the Court
declared that the statute invidiously discriminated against males between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one years of age and must therefore be
invalidated. o
Several years later in 1982, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of gender discrimination within the context of a
single-sex public institution of higher learning in Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan. 0 9 Ruling upon the constitutionality of the university's all-female nursing college, the Court declared it a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause to exclude men solely because of their sex. 110
The Court rejected Mississippi's argument that it maintained the nursing
school exclusively for women in an attempt to remedy past discrimination
against women in higher education. 1 1 Unpersuaded by the state's justification, the Court declared that the gender-based classification did not
survive intermediate scrutiny because women had not been historically

107 See Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
108 See id. The Court noted that because the statute only prohibited selling beer to
young men but did not prohibit drinking beer once acquired, the statute was ineffective.
See id.
109 See 458 U.S. 718, 719 (1982).
110 See id. at 731.
Plaintiff Joe Hogan was a registered nurse who wanted to earn a
baccalaureate degree in nursing. See id. at 720. Hogan applied for admission to the
Mississippi University for Women School of Nursing in 1979 and, although he was
qualified, his admission into the program was denied solely because of his gender. See
id. at 720-21. Hogan was informed that while he could audit the classes in which he expressed an interest, he was not permitted to enroll for credit. See id. at 721.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that the party seeking to uphold
a gender-based classification must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification." See
id. at 719, 724. The Justice further noted that such a burden can only be met by showing
that the gender-based "classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.'" Id. at 724 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980)). In applying the established test for gender-based classifications, the Justice continued, the Court cannot be influenced by traditional notions about the abilities and roles
of men and women, nor can the statutory objective reflect stereotypic and archaic notions.
See id. at 724-25. The statute will be unconstitutional, the Justice asserted, if its purpose
is to protect or exclude members of one gender based on the notion that they are innately
or inherently inferior. See id. at 725 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 68485 (1973)).
1 See id. at 727. The Court explained that Mississippi's attempt to remedy
past discrinination against women constituted educational affirmative action. See id. The Court
clarified that a state can only engage in this type of affirmative action when members of
the gender who stand to benefit as a result of the gender-based classification currently
endure a disadvantage related to that classification. See id. at 728.
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discriminated against in nursing.1 12 The Court asserted that rather than
compensating women for past discrimination, the nursing school's exclusion of men actually perpetuated the stereotype that nursing was solely a
woman's job; such an exclusion was therefore prohibited by the Constitution. 13
In the 1994 case of J.E.B. v. Alabama,1 4 the United States Supreme
Court suggested that gender-based classifications may no longer be analyzed under intermediate level review but rather may be elevated to the
more demanding strict scrutiny analysis.' 5 The Court in J.E.B. declared
that intentional gender discrimination by state actors using peremptory
strikes during jury selection violated the Equal Protection Clause and was
therefore prohibited. 1 6 In reaching this conclusion, the Court first remarked that intentional gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly when the discrimination perpetuates and ratifies overbroad, invidious, and archaic
stereotypes about the abilities and roles of men and women.1 17 The
plaintiff in J.E.B. argued that the rationale of Batson v. Kentucky,"'
which forbids peremptory strikes solely based on race, should similarly
be applied to prohibit the use of peremptory strikes solely based on gen112 See id. at 729. The Court further outlined that a year prior to the nursing school's
opening, 94% of students obtaining nursing baccalaureate degrees in Mississippi were
women, and nationwide, 98.6% of nursing degrees were earned by women. See id.
Consequently, the Court noted, the predominance of women within the field of nursing is
reflected in the labor force. See id.
113 See id. at 729-30. The Court declared that the nursing school's admissions policy
reinforced the outdated notion that only women should become nurses and rendered this
notion a self-fulfilling prophecy. See id. at 730.

Although Hogan seems clearly to have rejected public single-gender education, a
more thorough analysis has prompted some critics to view the decision not as a rejection
of single-gender education, but as an implied endorsement. See Kristin S. Caplice, The
Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 233 (1994).
Some critics view it as an endorsement because the Supreme Court limited its holding to
the nursing school, leaving intact the rest of the university's exclusively-female admissions policy. See id. Furthermore, the Court was not forced to rule on the constitutionality of a separate but equal system of public learning institutions for men and women because the plaintiff had no other local nursing educational programs available to him. See
id.
114 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
115 See Sara L. Mandelbaum, A JudicialBlow for "Jane Crowism" at the Citadel in
Faulkner v. Jones, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 3, 15 (1994).
116 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. Plaintiff, who was on trial to determine whether he
was the father of a minor, objected to the State's use of 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to
remove all male jurors during jury selection. See id. The trial court rejected plaintiff's
claim and impaneled an all-female jury, which subsequently found that plaintiff was the
father of the minor child and ordered him to pay child support. See id.
117 See id. at 130-31.
118 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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der.1 19 Although the J.E.B. Court acknowledged that the experiences of
racial minorities and women throughout American history have been
similar, the Court declined to determine which group has suffered and
endured more discrimination at the hands of state actors. 120 Instead, the
Court explained that the only issue in question was whether gender discrimination during jury selection substantially furthered the state's interest in providing fair and impartial trials.121

The Court declined to accept the state's stereotypical assumptions
about the inclinations of male and female jurors as a justification for continuing gender-based peremptory challenges because such assumptions
perpetuate the very stereotypes that the law prohibits. 122 In striking
down the use of gender-based peremptory challenges, the Court affirmed
that parties to a trial retain the freedom to remove jurors from the panel
whom they feel may be less acceptable than other jurors so long as gender does not serve as the sole proxy for the decision.1 3 As with racial
discrimination, the Court concluded, the guarantees of the Equal Protec-

119 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.
120 See id. at 135-36. The Court further professed that it was necessary simply to recognize and acknowledge America's unfortunate history of gender discrimination that consequently justified the heightened scrutiny afforded to all gender-based classifications.
See id. at 136. Although the Court willingly acknowledged this long history of gender
discrimination, the Court explicitly reserved for the future the determination of whether
gender-based discrimination, like racial discrimination, should be subject to a strict level
of scrutiny. See Mandelbaum, supra note 115, at 15.
121 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136-37. TheJ.E.B. Court explained:
In making this assessment, we do not weigh the value of peremptory challenges as an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate invidious discrimination from the courtroom. Instead, we consider whether
peremptory challenges based on gender stereotypes provide substantial aid
to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury.
Id. at 137.
122 See id. at 138. The Supreme Court pointed out that the State's rationale was
reminiscent of arguments once used to exclude women entirely from juries and the ballot
box. See id. at 138-39. The Court noted that the State incorrectly assumed that generalizations that would be clearly impermissible if based on race were somehow permissible
when based on gender. See id. at 139-40.
123 See id. at 143. Further, the Court sanctioned the use of peremptory challenges to
remove from the jury panel any class of individuals normally subjected to rational basis
review. See id. The Court determined that, as with race-based claims arising under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the burden similarly lies with the party alleging the
gender discrimination to make a prima facie case of intentional discrimination before a
court may require the other party to explain the reason for utilizing the peremptory challenge. See id. at 144-45. That party's explanation for removing a juror, the Court commented, must not be pretextual and must be based on a characteristic other than gender.
See id.at 145.
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tion Clause would be rendered
1 2 4 meaningless if jurors could be excluded
solely on the basis of gender.
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court grappled with the
issue of gender discrimination within the context of learning institutions
in the highly anticipated case of United States v. Virginia.125 Justice

Ginsburg, author of the majority opinion, 126 commenced the Court's
analysis by tracing the history of VMI back to 1839 when Virginia
founded the institution.127 The Justice briefly explained that, through the
employment of the adversative method, VMI successfully accomplishes
its distinctive mission of producing citizen-soldiers. 12S Justice Ginsburg
124

See id. at 146 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98).

125

116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).

126

See id. at 2269. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined

in Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, while Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion. See id. Justice Thomas
was involved in neither the consideration nor the disposition of this case. See id.
127 See id. Among Virginia's 15 public learning institutions, Justice Ginsburg
explained, VMI remained the sole single-sex institution. See id. The Court noted that from
its establishment as one of the country's first state military institutions, VMI has been
funded by Virginia and under the control of the State's General Assembly. See id. at
2269-70. The Court further recounted that VMI was the first southern institution of
higher learning to teach industrial chemistry and engineering, and at one point required

its students to teach in one of the state's schools for a period of two years. See id. at
2270. Although VMI's stability was threatened during the Civil War, the Justice continued, an innovative superintendent managed to regain legislative support for the school.
See id. Since then, Justice Ginsburg recognized, VMI has flourished and its popularity is
evident from its annual enrollment of about 1,300 male students. See id.
128 See id. at 2269. VMI has successfully completed this mission, Justice Ginsburg
recounted, throughout the years since the time of its establishment. See id. The Justice

explained that VMI's program is directed at preparing cadets for both civilian and military life, as opposed to the federal military institutions that exclusively prepare cadets for
service in the military. See id. at 2270.
The Court further explained that the adversative method induces doubt in the minds
of the cadets through "'[plhysical rigor, mental stress, absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.'"
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
Quoting one Commandant of Cadets, the majority noted that the process "dissects" the
VMI student, making him aware of his capabilities and limits to enable him to understand
the degree of stress and physical exhaustion his mind and body can endure. See id. The
majority further narrated that the training requires the cadets to live during the four years
in spartan barracks where they are constantly observed and where they can find absolutely no privacy. See id. New cadets are exposed to the adversative method in its most
extreme form, Justice Ginsburg continued, otherwise known as the "rat line." See id.
The Justice further noted that new cadets are also exposed to a hierarchical system of responsibilities and privileges, a "dyke system" that assigns an upper-class student mentor
to each entering cadet, and a stringent honor code that punishes those who steal, cheat,
lie, or who tolerate those who do. See id. The Justice elaborated that VMI endeavors to
instill mental and physical discipline in its cadets, while simultaneously imparting to them
the institution's strong moral code. See id. at 2269. The Court then explained that
VMI's graduates leave the school with a heightened understanding of their ability to deal
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then observed that, although neither VMI's mission nor its pedagogical
methodology were inherently unsuitable for female students, Virginia
continued to offer the benefits and advantages of a VMI education exclusively to men.129 The Justice recognized that admission to VMI had understandably become desirable to women because of the institution's
130
reputation as a unique and exceptionally challenging military school.
Next, the Court clarified the two ultimate issues in dispute: (1)
whether Virginia's exclusion of qualified women from the benefits and
advantages of a VMI education denied to them the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the law and (2) assuming VMI's
admissions policy was held unconstitutional, what was the appropriate
remedy for the constitutional violation. 131 Justice Ginsburg then determined that the Court must look primarily to the landmark decisions 133
of
32
J.E.B. v. Alabama' and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan
for the appropriate standard to apply to gender-based classifications. 1
The Justice next highlighted relevant cases that gradually
changed the
13
way the Court scrutinized gender-based classifications. 1

It was not until 1971 in Reed v. Reed, 136 the majority recounted,
that the Court first held that a state had violated a woman's equal protecwith stress, along with a strong feeling of accomplishment for having completed the rigorous course. See id.
129 See id. at 2269.
130 See id. at 2269, 2270. The Court reaffirmed that VMI's reputation is further enhanced by its outstanding record in producing leaders in all aspects of civilian and military life and because its alumni maintain remarkably close ties to the school. See id. at
2269, 2270-71.
131 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
132 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (finding that intentional gender discrimination by state
actors during jury selection violated the Equal Protection Clause and was therefore prohibited); see also supra notes 114-124 and accompanying text (discussing J.E.B.).
133 458 U.S. 718, 729, 731 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a state-sponsored nursing
school exclusively for women based on the rationale that the school was reinforcing the
stereotype that nursing was solely a woman's job); see also supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text (explaining Hogan).
13 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274. Citing J.E.B. and Hogan, the majority reiterated
that the party defending the gender-based classification must demonstrate an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for that classification. See id.
135 See id. at 2274-76. Justice Ginsburg noted that the heightened scrutiny
applied to
gender-based government action was a response to the historical discrimination against
women. See id. at 2274. The Justice explained that throughout most of the nation's history, women were not a part of "We the People" and that only in 1920 were women's
constitutional rights to vote recognized. See id. at 2275. Despite recognition of this
right, the Justice contended, both federal and state governments continued to discriminate
against women as long as they could create any basis to justify the discrimination. See id.
136 404 U.S. 71, 73, 77 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a state's probate code that
provided that men must be preferred over women when deciding between people equally
entitled to administer a decedent's estate); see also supra notes 86-92 and accompanying
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tion rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 37 From that moment on,

the Justice asserted, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged that it is unconstitutional for the government to deny to women their full stature as
citizens based solely on their gender.1 38 In summarizing the Court's cur-

rent position on gender-based classifications, the majority set forth the
established standard: it is the government's burden to prove that the
classification serves "'important governmental objectives and that the

discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" 139
Furthermore, the Justice explained, it is the Court's duty to determine whether the government's justification is "exceedingly persuasive." 140 Justice Ginsburg then asserted that gender-based classifications

may be justified only when employed as a means to compensate women
for disadvantages they have suffered in the past, but may never be utilized to 1 4perpetuate the economic, legal, and social inferiority of
women.
The Court then shifted its attention to Virginia's first justification
for maintaining VMI as an all-male institution. 14 Although the majority
text (outlining Reed).
137 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2275.
138 See id. For example, the Justice noted that in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, the Court
invalidated a law that automatically labeled the husband "head and master" of any property that he jointly owned with the wife, thereby giving the husband unilateral power to
dispose of the property without the wife's consent. See id. (citing Kirchberg v. Feenstra,
450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981)). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg continued, the Court in Stanton
v.Stanton invalidated a state law that required parents to support their male children until
the age of 21 and their female children only until the age of 18. See id. (citing Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 8, 17 (1975)). The Justice further stated that although the Court has
never equated gender-based classifications with race-based or national origin-based classifications, post-Reed decisions have demonstrated the Court's close and scrutinizing inspection of government action that either closes doors or denies opportunities to women.
See id.
139 Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). The
Court proclaimed that the government must prove that its justification for a gender-based
classification is genuine and not created or hypothesized in response to litigation. See id.
The Court further added that, as established in prior case law, the government's justification cannot be grounded on generalizations or stereotypes about the different capabilities
or preferences of men and women. See id. Justice Ginsburg declared that "'[i]nherent
differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity." Id. at 2276.
140 See id. at 2275.
141

See id. at 2276. The Court acknowledged that gender-based classifications may be

utilized to promote equal employment opportunities for women, to compensate women for
economic disadvantages they may have suffered, and to advance the development of
women's talents and abilities. See id.
142 See id. at 2276-77. Virginia asserted that single-gender education was beneficial
and that the option of single-gender education added diversity to the state's educational
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agreed with Virginia that diversity within the state's educational system
was beneficial, the Court declared that Virginia failed to provide persuasive evidence to prove that VMI had been established, or was being
maintained, for the purpose of diversifying the state's system of higher
education. 143 Justice Ginsburg announced that because Virginia had quite
liberally provided a unique educational opportunity to its male citizens
system. See id. at 2276. Virginia further proclaimed that the adversative training at VMI
would inevitably need to be modified if the school were to admit women. See id.
143 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277. Justice Ginsburg cautioned that the Court will
not automatically accept benign justifications offered to explain categorical exclusions.
See id. The Justice explained that a justification will survive scrutiny only if it establishes
a factual basis for the state's purposes. See id. The majority further asserted that the
present case was similar to Hogan because the Court found no nexus between the state's
objective of compensating women for past discrimination and the actual discriminatory
reason underlying the classification. See id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982)); see also supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text
(discussing Hogan). The Court recognized that when VMI was established in 1839, the
state scarcely thought about providing diversified educational opportunities for male and
female students. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2277. In fact, the Court noted, at that time it
was considered hazardous for women to pursue higher education because it would take
them away from their proper places in the home. See id. It was only in 1879, Justice
Ginsburg continued, that the state senate looked into the possibility of offering higher
education for women after recognizing that Virginia had failed to provide for the education of its daughters despite so liberally educating its sons. See id. at 2277-78. Despite
this acknowledgment, the Justice pointed out, it took Virginia several years to establish
women's colleges and seminaries. See id. at 2278. For example, the Justice recounted,
Farmville Female Seminary became public in 1884. See id. Similarly, the Justice continued, between the years 1908 and 1910, Virginia founded three women's colleges:
James Madison University, Mary Washington College, and Radford University. See id.
By the 1970s, the Court noted, Virginia converted all four schools into coeducational institutions. See id. The majority further added that the male-only admissions policy of
Virginia's flagship school, the University of Virginia, was held unconstitutional in 1970.
See id. (citing Kirstein v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184, 187 (E.D. Va. 1970)). Quoting from
a history book on women's education, the majority recounted that prior to Kirstein, the
debate centered on the fear that admitting women
would encroach on the rights of men; there would be new problems of
government, perhaps scandals; the old honor system would have to be
changed; standards would be lowered to those of other coeducational
schools; and the glorious reputation of the university, as a school for men,
would be trailed in the dust.
Id. (citation omitted).
Following the Court's 1982 decision in Hogan, Justice Ginsburg explained, VMI
conducted a reexamination of its admissions policy. See id. The Justice noted that the
VMI Board of Visitors appointed a Mission Study Committee that ultimately advised
against converting VMI into a coeducational institution. See id. The Court recognized
that Virginia was currently utilizing that Committee's recommendation as the basis for
maintaining VMI's current status as an all-male institution. See id. Stating that the Court
could "hardly extract from that effort any state policy evenhandedly to advance diverse
educational options," the Justice flatly rejected the Committee's findings. Id. at 2279.
The Court dismissed the Committee's evaluation that focused primarily on the expected
difficulty in attracting women to VMI and that, according to the Court, provided no explanation as to how the committee reached its conclusion. See id.
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without providing a corresponding opportunity to its female144citizens, the
state had denied to women the equal protection of the laws.
The majority next addressed Virginia's contention that admitting
women into VMI would significantly and detrimentally alter the adversative method, which makes the school's program unique. 145 Although
Justice Ginsburg conceded that admitting women would require the program to undergo certain changes and accommodations,146 the Court reiterated the circuit court's finding that neither VMI's goal to produce citizen-soldiers nor its adversative method was inherently unsuitable to
qualified women.1 47 Justice Ginsburg instructed that " [ s]tate actors controlling gates to opportunity ...may not exclude qualified individuals
based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females.'" 148
The majority rejected the argument that admitting women into VMI
would
the program.
149 The Court characterized this reasoning adversely
as both affect
an unproved
judgment
and a self-fulfilling prophecy,

144
145

See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2279.
See id. The Court noted that Virginia's concern was that accommodations for

women would be so drastic and radical that they would destroy the VMI program. See
id. The Court further explained that Virginia's fear was that such a transformation of
VMI would favor neither men nor women. See id. According to Virginia, the majority
stated, men would no longer have available to them VMI's unique program and women
would never experience the uniqueness of the program, because their participation would
completely eliminate the very characteristics of VMI that set it apart from the state's other
institutions of higher learning. See id.
146 See id. The Justice recognized that admitting women into VMI would
primarily
require accommodations in housing assignments along with a restructuring of the physical
training programs for the female students. See id.
147 See id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)). The
Court further recognized that some female students may prefer the VMI methodology to
that of women's colleges and would be interested in attending VMI if provided with the
opportunity. See id. The majority then declared, and all parties to the litigation agreed,
that even if the VMI program were left unaltered, certain women would still be able to
participate in cadet activities and meet the physical standards required of male cadets.
See id.
148 Id. at 2280 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982)); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (stating that the
Equal Protection Clause precludes state and federal governments from relying on sweeping generalizations to make "judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well
as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination").
The Court noted that most female students would not choose to undergo VMI's program, and indeed, most male students would prefer to be educated in a different environment. See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280. Education, the Court explained, is not a "one
size fits all" undertaking. See id. Justice Ginsburg then recognized that the issue was not
whether men or women should be forced to undergo the VMI program, but whether Virginia can constitutionally deny to qualified women the unique opportunities that VMI affords. See id.
149 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2280.
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reminiscent of earlier justifications used to deny women their rights and
opportunities. 15 In fact, Justice Ginsburg asserted, women's successful
participation in the federal military academies as well as in the military
forces proved that Virginia's fears for VMI's future were not grounded in
fact.151 The Justice concluded that Virginia's justifications for maintaining VMI as an exclusively-male institution did not qualify as
"exceedingly persuasive." 152
Next, Justice Ginsburg examined Virginia's proposed remedial plan
to maintain VMI as an exclusively male institution and establish VWIL as
a "parallel" program exclusively for women.153 The Court reminded
that, as established by precedent, a court must issue a remedial decree
that closely addresses the constitutional violation.154 In the present case,
the Court explained, because the constitutional violation was Virginia's
categorical exclusion of female citizens from the educational opportunities and benefits afforded to male citizens, the appropriate remedy was to
eradicate past discriminatory effects and to prevent similar discrimination
from occurring in the future.' 55 Instead of properly remedying the con150 See id. Justice Ginsburg noted that Virginia's current concerns were similar to
those historically expressed by the Court when women sought access to legal education
and admission to the bar. See id. For example, the Justice observed, in 1876 a Minnesota court creatively explained why women were not suited to the practice of law. See id.
Quoting the Minnesota court, the Justice recounted that women's role in educating and
training the young
forbids that they shall bestow that time (early and late) and labor, so essential in attaining to the eminence to which the true lawyer should ever aspire. It cannot therefore be said that the opposition of courts to the admission of females to practice ... is to any extent the outgrowth of... "old
fogyism." . . . [Ilt arises rather from a comprehension of the magnitude of
the responsibilities connected with the successful practice of law, and a
desire to grade up the profession.
Id. at 2280-81 (citation omitted).
The Court further recounted how similar fears led Columbia Law School to resist
admitting women. See id. at 2281. The Court stated that although Columbia's faculty
never proclaimed that women could not master the law, its opposition to the admission of
women was merely that if women were admitted "'then the choicer, more manly and redblooded graduates of our great universities would go to the Harvard Law School!'" Id.
(citation omitted). Similarly, the Court continued, women faced resistance upon seeking
admission to medical schools, police academies, and a number of other professions. See
id.
151 See id. at 2281.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 2282.
154 See id.; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977) (maintaining
that a
remedial decree must have the effect of placing people that have been unconstitutionally
denied benefits or opportunities in a position that they would have occupied absent the
discrimination).
155 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145,
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stitutional violation, the Justice observed, Virginia left VMI's exclusionary policy untouched and instead proposed a separate, different, and unequal program for women.156
The majority then delved into a thorough comparison of the programs offered at both VMI and VWIL in order to determine whether the
curricula could truly be labeled "parallel."' 57 The Court first recognized
that VWIL lacked the rigorous military training that set apart the VMI
experience from other military institutions.15 8 Instead of providing VMItype military training, the Justice noted, VWIL de-emphasized the military aspect of the program and instead used a "cooperative" method of
education to reinforce women's self-esteem. 159 Although Virginia argued
that pedagogical differences between the sexes required two separate programs, the Court rejected this reasoning because it was premised on
stereotypes and generalizations about men and women. 16 0 The Court
154 (1965)). The Court in Louisiana declared unconstitutional a requirement that voters
must first satisfy that they are able to understand any section of either the federal or state
constitutions before being permitted to vote. See Louisiana, 380 U.S. at 153.
156 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2282. According to Virginia, the Court related,
VWIL's program adequately paralleled VMI's program to produce citizen-soldiers
through military training, education, character, mental and physical discipline, and leadership development. See id. at 2283.
See id. at 2283.
158 See id.; see also United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413-14
(W.D. Va.
1991) (noting that there exists no other private or public school in the United States that
offers the same intense military training available at VMI).
159 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2283. The Court explained that although VWIL
students were required to participate in ROTC and a Virginia Corps of Cadets, VWIL was
not designed to be a military institute. See id. The majority further noted that VWIL students, unlike VMI cadets, were not required to live together, wear uniforms during
schooldays, or eat meals together. See id. The Court therefore recognized that VWIL
students would be deprived of the barracks experience that was essential to the overall
VMI experience. See id. Ironically, Justice Ginsburg observed, although Virginia declared the barracks experience to be the most crucial aspect of the VMI program, it
deemed such an experience inappropriate and unsuitable for the training of female cadets.
See id.
The Court further determined that the VWIL program lacked other important aspects
of the VMI program. See id. Justice Ginsburg stated that instead of receiving leadership
training like the cadets at VMI-through mental stress, physical rigor, constant regulation
of behavior, and the indoctrination in desirable beliefs and values- VWIL students participated in externships, seminars, and speakers series. See id. Upon graduation, the
Justice continued, VWIL students who did not experience the pressures, rigors, and psychological bonding between cadets that is characteristic of adversative training would not
feel the same sense of accomplishment commonly experienced by VMI graduates. See
id.; see also supra notes 53-79 and accompanying text (providing more information on
the VWIL program).
160 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2283-84. The Justice explained that the task force,
drawn from faculty at Mary Baldwin College, was responsible for designing and implementing the VWIL program and determined that a military program like VMI's would be
inappropriate for training and educating most women. See id. at 2283.
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further declared that a state policy based upon "the way women are" unfairly denies opportunities to individual women who, because of their talents and capacities, fall outside the stereotypical description of most
women. 161
Justice Ginsburg further observed that VWIL was not equal to VMI
in numerous other respects. 162 For example, the Justice commented,
VWIL lacked the faculty, course offerings, student body, and facilities
that contribute to VMI's notoriety.163 The majority further explained that
a VWIL graduate would not have at her disposal the benefits and advantages of graduating from an institution with the prestige, reputation, and
influential alumni network that results from a 157-year history. 164 In
161

See id. at 2284. The Court reiterated that Virginia decided not to make VWIL as

militaristic as VMI because VWIL was designed for women who did not contemplate pursuing military careers. See id. Only 15% percent of VMI graduates enter into military
careers; the Court thus asserted that VMI's militaristic program is therefore also inappropriate for men. See id.
162 See id.
163 See id. Examining the statistics, the Court observed that the student body at VWIL
would be composed of first-year students whose average combined SAT score was approximately 100 points lower than that of entering students at VMI. See id. In addition,
the majority noted, not only does the faculty at Mary Baldwin College receive substantially lower salaries, but as a group they hold fewer Ph.D.s than the faculty at VMI. See
id. Justice Ginsburg further recognized that the VWIL program lacked the array of curricular choices that were available to VMI students. See id. The Justice observed that
while VMI cadets could earn degrees in a number of areas such as the liberal arts, chemistry, biology, or electrical, computer, civil, or mechanical engineering, the VWIL program lacked top-rate courses in engineering, math, physics, and science. See id.
The majority further explained that other differences between the two programs included physical training resources. See id. While VWIL students would have access to
one gymnasium and two multipurpose fields, the Court continued, VMI students have access to
an NCAA competition level indoor track and field facility; a number of
multi-purpose fields; baseball, soccer and lacrosse fields; an obstacle
course; large boxing, wrestling and martial arts facilities; an 1l-laps-to-themile indoor running course; an indoor pool; indoor and outdoor rifle
ranges; and a football stadium that also contains a practice field and outdoor track.
Id. at 2284-85 (citing United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 503 (W.D. Va. 1994)).
Additionally, the Justice pronounced, Virginia would provide unequal financial support to
both institutions. See id. at 2285. The Court explained that while Mary Baldwin's current endowment stood at about $19 million with an additional $35 million in future
commitments, VMI had a current endowment of $131 million (the highest per-student endowment in the United States) and stood to gain $220 million in future commitments. See
id.
164 See 4. at 2284. The Court contended that the VWIL diploma would not unite the
graduating student with VMI graduates who had successfully distinguished themselves in
both civilian and military life. See id. at 2285. The majority realized that a VWIL
graduate would not have available to her the impressive and extensive network of alumni
and opportunities available to a VMI cadet. See id.
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sum, the Justice declared, Virginia failed in its quest to provide to
women a single-gender institution comparable to VMI and instead merely
created a "pale shadow" of that model institution.165 As a result, the
Court explained that Virginia failed to comply with the Sweatt v.
Painter16 requirement that separate educational opportunities be substantially equal. IT7
Continuing, the Court criticized the Fourth Circuit's approval of
Virginia's remedial plan. 16 The Court observed that instead of inquiring
into whether VWIL adequately placed women in the same position that
they would have occupied absent the discrimination, the court of appeals
incorrectly considered whether Virginia could, within the parameters of
the Constitution, provide separate and unequal educational opportunities
for men and women. 169 Justice Ginsburg noted that although the Fourth
Circuit acknowledged the existence of significant differences between
VMI and VWIL, it nonetheless approved of the VWIL program by substituting the established level of review for gender-based classifications
with a newly created standard. 17 The Justice criticized the court of appeals for devising its own test- a "substantive comparability" inquiryand for subsequently finding that the requirements for this new test were
satisfied. 171 In correcting the Fourth Circuit's inappropriate analysis, the
majority proclaimed 172that all gender-based classifications must undergo
heightened scrutiny.
Finally, the Court concluded that pursuant to Virginia's obligation
to provide its citizens with equal protection of the laws, Virginia could
173
not offer qualified women anything less than a VMI-type education.
Justice Ginsburg explained that a primary part of constitutional history
has consisted of the deliberate extension of constitutional protections to
people once excluded or ignored by the majority. 174 As a result, the Jus165 See id.at 2285.

166 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

In Sweatt, the Court declared two racially segregated law

schools to be substantially unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional because the students
attending the blacks-only law school lacked numerous educational opportunities due to the
physical and intangible factors that made the whites-only law school superior. See id. at
633-34; see also supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (outlining Sweatt).
167 See Virgina, 116 S.Ct. at 2286.
168 See id.
169 See id.
170 See id. The majority proclaimed that the deferential analysis that the Fourth Circuit applied was wholly inconsistent with the standard established by precedent. See id.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 2286 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)).
173 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2287.
174 See id.(citing RICHARD MoRRis, THE FORGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 193
(1987)).
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tice opined that the notion of "We the People" has expanded throughout
history and there is thus no longer any reason to believe that admitting
qualified women into VMI would destroy its program rather than enhance
its ability to serve the "more perfect Union. w175
Authoring a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist approved
of the majority's holding but criticized its reasoning.1 7 6 The Chief Justice first outlined the appropriate standard of review with which to analyze gender-based classifications as initially set forth in Craig v.
Boren. 177 Although the Court applied the appropriate standard, the Chief
Justice explained, the majority added an element of uncertainty by requiring Virginia to demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
its gender-based classification. 17 The concurrence then announced that
in order to avoid potential confusion in the future, the majority should
have adhered closer to the firmly established traditional test.
Chief Justice Rehnquist next recognized that although VMI was
founded under the nineteenth-century notion that only men were suited
for higher education, policies reflecting this notion were not unconstitutional in 1839 when VMI was established.1is The Chief Justice admonSee id.
See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
177 See id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
175

176

197 (1976)). In Craig, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute that prohibited the
sale of beer to females under the age of 18 and to males under the age of 21, and determined that gender-based classifications "must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 429 U.S. at 197,
210 see also supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (discussing Craig).
See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that although phrases such as "important governmental objective"
and "substantially related" were somewhat vague, they were more specific and unambiguous than the majority's phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification." See id.
179 See id.
180 See id. The Chief Justice also noted that even after the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was nearly a century later that the Court began using heightened scrutiny
for gender-based classifications. See id. For some time after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the concurrence recounted, the Court allowed government to make
baseless distinctions between women and men. See id. at 2288-89 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (holding that despite the
progress made with respect to women's opportunities, women nonetheless continued to be
regarded as the nucleus of the home and family); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466
(1948) (declaring constitutional a Michigan statute that prohibited a woman from obtaining a bartending license unless she was the daughter or wife of a male owner of a liquor
establishment).
Chief Justice Rehnquist then agreed with the majority that the seminal case for analyzing gender-based classifications is Reed, although as the Chief Justice pointed out, the
Reed decision had nothing to do with seeking admission to an educational institution. See
Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2289 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971)). Chief Justice Rehnquist then posited that although Reed was not sufficient to
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ished the Court for using Virginia's historical justifications for its allmale policy against it."' The Chief Justice agreed with the majority,
however, that even Virginia's current justification of promoting diversity
in higher education did not justify VMI's exclusively male policy, because there was no corresponding opportunity for women. 18 2 The concurrence further proclaimed that Virginia's remedial options were not as
limited as the Court implied." 3 The Chief Justice realized that a legislative magic wand could not automatically create a VMI-ite program for
Chief Justice
women nor should the state cease its support of VMI.1
Rehnquist then concluded that Virginia could have avoided a constitutional violation by making a genuine effort to create an all-female institution with comparable public resources. 18 5 The Chief Justice reiterated
that the state should not have been faced with the rigid choice of either
changing VMI's admissions policy to include women or abandoning VMI
altogether and starting from scratch. 8 6
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Court's suggestion that the only remedy for the constitutional violation was for VMI to
admit women. 18 The Chief Justice characterized Virginia's violation of
the Equal Protection Clause as one that was unconstitutional, not because
it excluded women from VMI, but because it maintained an all-male

put Virginia or VMI on notice about the constitutionality of VMI's admissions policy,
Hogan did in fact place the state on notice that VMI's exclusively-male admissions policy
may violate the Constitution. See id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982)).
See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2289-90 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
182 See id. at 2290 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). From the moment Hogan placed
181

Virginia on notice, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, the state had the opportunity to resolve the problem by admitting female students. See id. The Chief Justice recognized,
however, that because the state did nothing to avoid a constitutional violation, the Court
need not inquire as to what Virginia could have done in order to pass constitutional muster. See id.
183 See id.
18 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
The concurrence stated that if Virginia was willing to provide diversity
within its educational system in the form of single-sex education, then that diversity must

have been open to females as well as to males. See id. Agreeing with the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist further opined that Virginia's goal of keeping VMI exclusively male in
order to preserve the adversative method was not a sufficiently important government
objective. See id. Because the adversative method is not pedagogically beneficial, the
Chief Justice continued, Virginia did not have a substantial interest in making it available

to its citizens. See id. The concurrence further noted that, unlike the abundant evidence
that demonstrated that single-gender education is pedagogically beneficial to some students, there was no similar evidence that proved that the adversative method is also as
beneficial. See id. at 2290-91 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
187 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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school without providing a comparable institution for females." 8 In fact,
the concurrence continued, Virginia may have remedied the constitutional
violation by demonstrating that its commitment to educating male students in a single-gender institution was matched by its corresponding
8
commitment to educating female students in a single-gender institution.' 9
The Chief Justice further asserted that while it was appropriate for the
state to create single-gender programs according to public interest and
demand, it was inappropriate for the state to gauge public interest and
demand based upon stereotypes.1 90 For example, the concurrence added,
the state should not make the unsupported assumption that women would
have no interest in attending a school of civil engineering for women or
that men would have a similar lack of interest in attending a nursing
school for men.1 91 The Chief Justice then proclaimed that, because Virginia's proposed women's institution was distinctly inferior to VMI, it
undoubtedly failed as a remedy for Virginia's constitutional violation. 1
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for shutting down a
distinctive and historical institution such as VMI, and in so doing, rejecting the factual findings of the lower courts, ignoring precedent, and
casting away the history of the nation's people. " Although the dissent
acknowledged it appropriate for the Court to condemn society's past intolerance and mistreatment of women, Justice Scalia praised the nation's
ancestors for writing into the Constitution the opportunity to change the
laws accordingly to fit the evolving views of society. 194 The Justice pos188

See id.

189 See id.

Chief Justice Rehnquist further clarified that Virginia could have demon-

strated its interest in providing single-gender education for both genders by supporting
two institutions with educational offerings of the same quality and overall caliber. See id.
In order to demonstrate such a commitment, the Chief Justice asserted, it was irrelevant
that both institutions did not have comparable athletic fields, did not accept students with
similar SAT scores, and did not hire the same number of faculty with Ph.D.s. See id. It
would even be acceptable, the concurrence stated, if the institutions offered their students
different curriculum, or if one institution was particularly strong in one field, and the
other institution in another. See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Justice Scalia criticized

the Court for rejecting the factual findings of the lower courts that developmental differences between the sexes justified Virginia's decision to apply the adversative method only

to an all-male institution. See id. The Justice further criticized the Court's disregard for
the lower court's finding that VMI must be kept exclusively male in order to maintain its
character and reputation. See id. The dissent further noted that the majority not only revised the established precedent for analyzing gender-based classifications but also ignored

the long tradition of state supported and federally supported all-male military colleges.
See id.
194 See id. at 2291-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ited that a democratic system that enables people to change their laws "is
destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the
democratic process and written into the Constitution." 195 The dissent
denounced the majority's attempt to inscribe into "Basic Law" the current preferences and views of society. 196 The dissent further criticized
the Court for concluding that an all-male military institution served no
substantial educational value when the people of Virginia had already
decided to maintain VMI as an exclusively male institution and women
had the opportunity to attend other educational institutions.1 97 Justice
Scalia buttressed his opinion by noting that the United States Constitution, the old one prior to modification by the majority opinion, stands
neutral in this educational debate.'9"
The dissent criticized the Court's approach of evaluating every type
of equal protection claim under either rational basis review, intermediate
review, or strict scrutiny. 199 These three tests, the Justice asserted, are
neither scientific nor predictable and are further compromised by the fact
that the decision as to which one to apply is largely left to the Court's
discretion. 20 0 Although the dissent acknowledged that application of the
three levels of scrutiny is essential to evaluating whether the restrictions
imposed on private conduct comport with the Equal Protection Clause,
the Justice refuted the notion that the Court's function is to revise society's values regarding equal protection and declared that the Court must
instead preserve such values. 20 1 Specifically, Justice Scalia proffered,
whichever abstract tests the Court devises and applies, the Court should
not use such tests to supersede the unbroken and constant national traditions that embody society's understanding of vague constitutional texts. 20 2
195 Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

See id.
See id.
198 See id.
199 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200 See id. For example, the dissent posited, strict scrutiny should be applied only in
196

197

instances where a government classification has infringed upon traditionally protected interests. See id.Because the Court has not historically accepted this view, Justice Scalia
recognized, the Court has applied strict scrutiny to the deprivation of any right considered
to be fundamental. See id.Similarly, the Justice asserted, the Court has yet to establish
the criteria for applying intermediate scrutiny but will "essentially apply it when it seems
like a good idea to load the dice." Id. The Justice then explained that up to the present
time, intermediate scrutiny has been applied to gender-based classifications, contentneutral restrictions on speech, and questions of illegitimacy. See id.
201 See id.
2W See id. The Justice reiterated that "'when a practice not expressly prohibited by
the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have
no proper basis for striking it down.'" Id. (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of in., 497
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The dissent then posited that VMI's admissions policy was one of
these unbroken and constant national traditions and was as well-rooted
into the nation's history as is the tradition of only sending men into military combat. 20 3 In fact, the dissent observed, only the people may change
these traditions through the democratic process; therefore, the majority's
declaration that these traditions are unconstitutional is not law but
"politics-smuggled-into-law. " 2°4
By favoring current notions of
women's education, the dissent explained, and by writing these notions
into the Constitution, the Court had created a new Constitution instead of
merely interpreting the old one. 205
The dissent further criticized the Court for failing to apply the intermediate scrutiny test in the manner in which it had been historically
applied to gender discrimination cases. 06 Although the Court recited the
question posed by the intermediate scrutiny test correctly, the dissent observed, the majority's analysis did not demonstrate an appropriate application of the test.20 7 Noting that the majority's use of the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" was questionable, the dissent argued that the Court's conclusion could only have been reached by substi208
tuting this phrase for the appropriate standard.
In addition, the dissent
U.S. 62, 95 (1990)).
23 See id. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent highlighted that
all state and
federal government-supported military institutions, such as The Citadel, West Point, and
the Naval Academy at Annapolis, began as institutions exclusively for men. See id. The
admission of women, the Justice observed, was brought about by the people through their
repsentatives and not by a court decree. See id.
See id. Similarly, Justice Scalia recognized, the national tradition of providing
single-gender education for both sexes is also threatened by the majority's decision. See
id. The Justice further reiterated that the tradition of single-gender education may only be
ch!a!ged by the people and not by the Court. See id.
See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
W6 See id.
M7 See id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208 See id. The dissent explained that the majority's use of the phrase
"exceedingly
persuasive justification" would be "unobjectionable if the Court acknowledged that
whether a 'justification' is 'exceedingly persuasive' must be assessed by asking '[whether]
the classification serves important governmental objectives and [whether] the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'"
Id. However, Justice Scalia continued, the Court chose instead to interpret that phrase in
a manner that goes against both precedent and the reasoning of Hogan. See id. (citing
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). The Court's use of
the "exceedingly persuasive" phrase, the Justice continued, was essential to the Court's
decision because it established that VMI's admissions policy failed the intermediate scrutiny test if there were some women capable of attending VMI and successfully undertaking all of its physical activities and requirements. See id. In order to arrive at the
Court's conclusion, the dissent observed, the Court must have used the amorphous
'exceedingly persuasive justification" phrase instead of the standard recitation of the intermediate scrutiny test. See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned
that only application of this amorphous phrase could have allowed the Court to conclude
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observed, the majority left unanswered the question of whether genderbased classifications should be held to the highest standard of judicial
review, known as strict scrutiny. 2 9 In so doing, Justice Scalia contended, the Court not only overlooked its duty to clarify the law, but
made the law even more ambiguous than it was before. 2 1 The Justice
then proffered that both state and federal governments are entitled to
know, prior to acting, the standards to which government actions will be
held and should not be forced to guess about the result of "Supreme
Court peek-a-boo. " 2 11 The Justice concluded that, even if the question of
the appropriate scrutiny to apply to gender-based classifications was truly
undecided, the best approach would be to reduce the standard to rational
basis review rather than elevate it to strict scrutiny analysis.2 2
Justice Scalia next proceeded to explain methodically the appropriate
manner in which the Court should have conducted the analysis.2 13 The
Justice first declared that Virginia undeniably had an important interest in
providing its citizens with numerous options for an effective college education, one of those options being single-gender education.2 14 The Justhat so long as one woman could survive VMI's program, then VMI's single-sex composition was unconstitutional. See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asserted that the standard intermediate scrutiny test had never required a "least-restrictivemeans" analysis, but rather only required a substantial relation between the state's interest and the classification. See id. The dissent further stated that cases analyzed under the
intermediate scrutiny test have only required a substantial relation between the end and
the means, but have never required a perfect fit. See id.
29 See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). By leaving this question unanswered,
Justice Scalia declared, the majority mistakenly suggested that the Court had not previously
held the strict scrutiny test inapplicable to gender-based classifications. See id. Such a
false suggestion, the dissent pointed out, had the effect of both destabilizing current law
and ignoring precedent. See id.
210 See id.
211 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212

See id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To illustrate that the Court has never

held gender-based classifications to the standard of strict scrutiny, the dissent proclaimed
that until the 1970s, the Court applied rational basis review to gender-based classifications. See id. at 2296. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia further reasoned:
It is hard to consider women a "discrete and insular minorit[yl" unable to
employ the "political processes ordinarily to be relied upon," when they
constitute a majority of the electorate. And the suggestion that they are incapable of exerting that political power smacks of the same paternalism that
the Court so roundly condemns.
Id. (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938)).
213 See id. The Justice then reiterated that the proper focus of the
Court's inquiry
should have been whether VMI's exclusion of women was "substantially related to an
unmrrtant governmental objective." Id.
See id. Noting that single-sex education was substantially related to meeting Virginia's interest, the dissent emphasized that similarly all-men's and all-women's colleges
possess long and successful histories. See id. Justice Scalia further stressed that the evi-
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tice declared that the abundant evidence favoring single-gender education
alone was sufficient to allow VMI's male-only admissions policy to pass
constitutional muster. 215 The dissent proclaimed that Virginia's decision
to maintain one school that employed the adversative method was substantially related to the state's goal of providing diversity in its system of
216
Because admitting women would eventually force
higher education.
VMI to drop the adversative method altogether, the dissent explained,
Virginia's only real options included either admitting women and dropping the adversative method, or maintaining the adversative method and
continuing to exclude women. 2 17 As a practical matter, due to the state's
limited resources, Justice Scalia recognized, Virginia chose to fund fourteen coeducational colleges and VMI, the only all-male college characterized by the adversative method.21 8
Next, Justice Scalia refuted the Court's notion that Virginia's actual
reason for maintaining....
VMI as an exclusively
219 male institution was merely
The Justice also refuted the
an excuse to discriminate against women.
Court's implication that Virginia's failure to state explicitly its actual
purpose in the record rendered VMI's admissions policy invalid. 22 0 The
dissent further asserted that the Constitution does not require a state to
dence presented in the lower courts overwhelmingly established that single-gender education benefits both men and women, particularly at the college level. See id. In addition,
the Justice observed, Virginia adequately demonstrated through substantial research that
men and women have different developmental and pedagogical needs. See id. at 2296-97

(Scalia, J., dissenting).

215 See id. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216 See id. Noting that education is not "one size fits all," the Justice maintained that a

state is free to decide whether it wants to support vocational institutes, junior colleges, or
a law school that focuses on case practice rather than classroom study. See id.
217 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2297 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 See id.
219 See id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2M See id. The dissent explained that because VMI originally excluded women on the

belief that women were not fit for leadership and military roles, the Court has condemned
Virginia for failing to provide a contemporary and valid rationale for VMI's admissions
policy. See id. Characterizing this requirement as absurd, Justice Scalia explained that a
state's decision to adopt a particular government policy does not need to be accompanied- for the sake of future litigation-by an attorney's contemporaneous statement of
that state's purposes. See id. Justice Scalia observed that because the 1839 anti-female
policy did not remain enshrined in Virginia's legislation nor was it ever explicitly recorded, such a policy could not possibly remain as Virginia's actual purpose in maintaining VMI as an all-male institution. See id. at 2298-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice
urged deference to the 1990 Report of the Virginia Commission on the University of the
21st Century to the General Assembly and the Governor as indicative of Virginia's explicit statement of the contemporary reasons for VMI's exclusionary policy. See id. at
2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This report, the Justice noted, stated that Virginia's educational policy was characterized by both diversity and autonomy. See id. Indeed, Justice
Scalia asserted, the Court could not deny that an explicit statement of Virginia's contemporary reasons did exist. See id.
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justify and set forth explicit rationale for the actions it takes. 221 The dissent criticized the Court's rejection of Virginia's argument that it was
promoting diversity by granting its institutions of higher learning substantial autonomy and the authority to decide relevant matters such as
student-body composition. =
Actually, the Justice reasoned, such
autonomous institutions promote diversity, because each institution has
the incentive to distinguish itself from the others in order to attract certain students from the larger pool of applicants.= The Justice then conceded that none of these institutions was truly autonomous because the
legislature could always withdraw funding if it decided that a particular
school was not adequately promoting Virginia's interest in educational

diversity

224

Justice Scalia next addressed the Court's willingness to find fault
with Virginia's decision not to provide a program based on the adversative method for women. 225 The Justice decried the Court's criticism of
the district court, which relied on Virginia's expert witness testimony. 226
By dispensing with both the evidence submitted at trial and the findings
of the lower courts, the dissent posited, the Court managed to render the
trial a sham.227 The dissent observed that (1) no witness had contested
221 See id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent proclaimed that "[tihe
Constitution is not some giant Administrative Procedure Act, which imposes upon the States the
oblation to set forth a 'statement of basis and purpose' for their sovereign acts." Id.
See id. at 2300 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice rejected the appellate court's
suggestion that it was impossible for an autonomous state institution, lacking any authority over any other institution, to effectuate a policy of diversity among educational institutions. See id. Justice Scalia further commented:
If it were impossible for individual human beings (or groups of human beings) to act autonomously in effective pursuit of a common goal, the game
of soccer would not exist. And where the goal is diversity in a free market
for services, that tends to be achieved even by autonomous actors who act
out of entirely selfish interests and make no effort to cooperate.
Id.
2M See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2300 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
224 See id.
M5 See id. The Justice criticized the majority's absolute dismissal of the lower court's
findings with respect to gender-based developmental and learning differences. See id.
The dissent observed that the Court dismissed such findings on the grounds that they
merely restated stereotypical opinions about men and women expressed by Virginia's expert witnesses. See id.
2M See id. "How remarkable," Justice Scalia professed, "to criticize the
District
Court on the ground that its findings rest on the evidence (i.e., the testimony of Virginia's
witnesses)! That is what findings are supposed to do." Id. The Justice rebuked the
Court for telling Virginia that the burden of justification rested on the state. See id. Justice Scalia then admonished the majority, which ignored the district court's findings, because those findings rested on the evidence put forth by Virginia. See id.
M7 See id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court had in actuality, the dissent recognized, substituted the evidence and the lower court's findings with the "Justices' own
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Virginia's substantial evidence that single-gender education is beneficial
to both genders and (2) the majoritymust have arrived at the holding by
rendering such evidence irrelevant.
The dissent predicted that the Court's analysis will produce several
foreseeable results. 229 The dissent elaborated that the Court's approach
will generally result in any all-male policy being deemed unconstitutional
whenever the state's objective in pursuing the policy is ample enough to
accommodate women-which will always be the case.23 0 Justice Scalia
further dismissed the Court's argument that VMI would not need to undergo substantial changes if it became a coeducational institution because
the Court's inquiry needed to go no further after finding that VMI's admissions policy was substantially related to an important state interest. 23 1
The Justice declared, however, that even if it were appropriate to undertake such a debate, the Court's conclusion would prove incorrect because
the record supported the finding that at least three characteristics of
VMI's program would undergo change: (1) the physical training, (2) the
adversative method, and (3) the absence of privacy. 232 In light of these
findings, Justice Scalia pronounced, it was clear that upon admitting
women, VMI would be significantly altered and would eventually be
forced to drop the adversative method altogether.2 33

view of the world." id.
228 See id.
M9 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2301 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
230 See id. Justice Scalia explained that under the Court's analysis, a state's objectives
will be struck down as unconstitutional "no matter how few women are interested in pursuing the objective by that means, no matter how much the single-sex program will have
to be changed if both sexes are admitted, and no matter how beneficial that program has
theretofore been to its participants." Id.
231 See id. at 2301-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There should therefore be no debate,
the dissent indicated, over the extent to which VMI would have to change upon admitting
women and whether those changes would be too much to ask VMI to undertake. See id.
at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232 See id. at 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Quoting the district court, the dissent recognized that other changes would include
new allowances for personal privacy in the barracks, such as locked doors
and coverings on windows, which would detract from VMI's approach of
regulating minute details of student behavior, "contradict the principle that
everyone is constantly subject to scrutiny by everyone else," and impair
VMI's "total egalitarian approach" under which every student must be
"treated alike"; changes in the physical training program, which would reduce "[tihe intensity and aggressiveness of the current program"; and
various modifications in other respects of the adversative training program
which permeates student life.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 141213 1435-43 (W.D. Va. 1991)).
233 See id.
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Further, the dissent declared it immaterial that Virginia failed to
create an all-women's institution parallel to VMI.234 Justice Scalia asserted that if the constitutionality of a single-gender program were to be
measured by whether a parallel program for the other gender exists, then
the Hogan opinion, which observed that Mississippi did not support any
other single-gender institution of higher learning, would have ended at
the first footnote.
The Justice explained that Virginia's establishment
of VWIL as a parallel program should have been irrelevant to the Court's
analysis, because VMI's all-male composition was found to be
"substantially related" to an important state interest. 236 The dissent further indicated that VWIL was properly designed to provide a program for
women that would achieve substantially similar results to those achieved
at VMI. 237 The dissent agreed with officials at Mary Baldwin College
who explained that, although creating a mirror image of VMI would have
required less research, thought, and educational expertise, such an elementary approach would have resulted in a paper program without a real
expectation of success. 238 Justice Scalia contended that although the
VWIL program was carefully and thoroughly designed by professional
and experienced educators, the Court nonetheless baldly declared that
such professionals
acted on stereotypes and generalizations about
2 39
women.
Justice Scalia next criticized the concurring opinion for being even
less plausible, although more moderate, than the majority opinion.2 40
The Justice disagreed with the concurring opinion's assertion that there
was scarce evidence in the record to prove that diversity was the actual
reason Virginia decided to maintain VMI as an all-male institution.241
The Justice refuted this argument and instead declared that the record

2M See id. The dissent cited Hogan, where the Court found it of no constitutional
significance that the state failed to create an exclusively-male nursing school. See id. at
2302-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982)).
235 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2303 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2M See id.
237 See id. The VWIL program, the dissent noted, rejected the notion that there
exists
a "difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman." Id. (quoting
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872)). The dissent declared that the
district court correctly held that there existed a valid pedagogical basis for VMI and
VWIL to employ different means in order to achieve substantially similar results. See id.
238 See id.
239 See id. The dissent noted that the Court did not consider that no expert for the
United States testified that the adversative method was appropriate for the education of
women. See id.
240 See id.
241

See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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contained substantial evidence to indicate that diversity was the state's
actual objective. 242 The dissent then criticized the concurrence's second
point that maintaining the adversative method did not serve an important
government objective.243 The pedagogical benefits of the adversative
method, the Justice emphasized, had been proven time and again
throughout the litigation.
Lastly, the dissent criticized the concurring opinion's third ration-

ale, namely that after Hogan, Virginia should have recognized that it
needed to provide comparable public resources in an all-female institution
in order to avoid an equal protection violation.24 5 Justice Scalia considered it unrealistic for Virginia to have known pursuant to Hogan-which
did not require the state to establish a corresponding single-gender institution for both sexes-that Virginia was then expected to institute a parallel VMI-type program for women. 246 In sum, the Justice noted, the concurrence had improperly disregarded both the four all-female private
colleges in Virginia and the state's policy of coordinating private with
public educational offerings. 2 47 In fact, the dissent proclaimed, no need
existed to make VMI a coeducational institution when both male and fe242

See id. at 2304 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice further noted that one must first

reject, as done by the concurrence, the initial reason for VMI's establishment in days
when beliefs and attitudes towards women's education were drastically different. See id.
Justice Scalia further declared that it was absurd to require Virginia to prove that it maintained an exclusively-male military academy in order to foster diversity in the educational
system. See id. In fact, the Justice continued, requiring Virginia to prove that diversity
was the real reason for VMI's admissions policy was similar to requiring the United
States Army to record evidence that its mission is to prepare soldiers for battle. See id.
The Justice proclaimed that "[a] legal culture that has forgotten the concept of res ipsa
lo uitur deserves the fate that it today decrees for VMI." Id.
See id.
244 See id. The dissent explained that the benefits of the adversative method had been
established from the beginning because the woman who prompted the suit wanted to attend VMI not because of its all-male composition-it would no longer be all-male once
she was admitted-but because of the unique adversative education that VMI provides.
See id. Similarly, because the concurrence agreed that single-gender education is beneficial, the Justice continued, that alone was sufficient to decide in Virginia's favor because
admitting women to VMI would do away with both single-gender education and the adversative method. See i&.at 2304-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
M See id. at 2305 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246 See id. The Justice commented:
Any lawyer who gave that advice to the Commonwealth ought to have
been either disbarred or committed. (The proof of that pudding is today's
6-Justice majority opinion.) And any Virginia politician who proposed
such a step when there were already 4 4-year women's colleges in Virginia
(assisted by state support that may well exceed, in the aggregate, what
VMI costs... ) ought to have been recalled.
Id.
247 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2305 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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male citizens already possessed diverse opportunities in the2 4form of coeducational and single-gender institutions of higher learning. 8
Justice Scalia then opined that the Court's decision would adversely
affect the future of all single-gender public institutions. 2 49 The dissent
continued, however, that because the Court characterized the decision as
applying only to unique educational opportunities such as those offered
by VMI, the Court had created the illusion that in future cases government officials could constitutionally justify single-gender institutions. 250
Justice Scalia announced that the principal role of the Supreme
Court is to establish precedent and laws that bind all lower courts, not to
make decisions on unique or rare dispositions. 25 1 By proclaiming that
any unique single-gender program must also be offered to any member of
the opposite sex equally capable of participating in that program, the dissent explained that the Court had effectively killed single-gender public
education. 252 The Court's decision, the dissent opined, was especially
regrettable because of the increasing awareness and recognition of the
253
benefits that single-gender education provides to both men and women.
2" See id. The dissent criticized the concurring opinion for discounting Virginia's
assistance to its all-women's private colleges because the state treated the private
women's colleges in the same manner it treated all of its other private colleges. See id.
The dissent further observed:

But if Virginia cannot get credit for assisting women's education if it only
treats women's private schools as it does all other private schools, then
why should it get blame for assisting men's education if it only treats VMI
as it does all other public schools? This is a great puzzlement.
Id.

249 See
See
251 See
252 See

id.
id.

id.
id. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

The dissent observed that along with the

risks of losing, the expense of litigating whether single-gender programs are constitutional
is too high for government officials to embrace. See id. The Court's decision, Justice
Scalia asserted, will enable any person to bring into court any state that supports a singlegender program and compel it to demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the gender-based classification. See id. The Justice then acknowledged that if other
courts heed this ambiguous language, it will be impossible for a state to satisfy that requirement even with abundant evidence. See id. The effect of this, the dissent observed,
will be that:
No state official in his right mind will buy such a high-cost, high-risk lawsuit by commencing a single-sex program. The enemies of single-sex education have won; by persuading only seven Justices ... that their view of
the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effectively imposed
that view on all 50 States.
Id.
253 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent recounted the
failure of the Detroit Board of Education in 1991 to establish an experimental program
exclusively for inner-city male youths. See id. The dissent recounted that the plan was

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:233

Justice Scalia next expressed concern for the future of private sin254
gle-gender institutions that receive substantial government support.
The dissent dismissed as meaningless the Court's distinction that private
institutions are not converted into state actors, for purposes of equal
protection analysis, merely because they directly or indirectly benefit by
government funding. 5 The real issue, the dissent explained, is whether
by providing funds to private single-gender institutions, a state is itself
violating the Constitution. 6
Justice Scalia further hypothesized that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to find future circumstances under which the Court will hold
private single-gender programs to be constitutional unless the Court first
does away with the legal principles applied to the present case.Y The
Justice recognized this abandonment of legal principles to be a strong
possibility because the present decision itself abandoned principles of law
traditionally applied to gender-based classifications.25 8
Lastly, the dissent rejected the Court's self-righteous imposition of
its own economic and social preferences on the entire nation.2 9 Justice
Scalia asserted that the Court's decision progressively narrowed the
sphere of self-government that should be left untouched and reserved to
the American people. 26 0 The Justice then concluded by recognizing that
no court opinion could leave VMI without honor and none, including
women, will be better off in the future for the destruction of VMI. 26 1
swiftly abandoned upon the filing of a lawsuit against the Board and upon the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction. See id. Justice Scalia concluded that the
Court's decision regrettably guaranteed that no similar experiment will ever again be
tried. See id.
254 See id. The dissent relied on statistics to demonstrate that for the 1990-1991 school
year, private institutions derived about 19% of their financial budgets from local, state,
and federal governments. See id. Also of significance, the Justice continued, are the
facts that these governments provided substantial financial aid for students to attend private institutions and that the institutions retained charitable status under the states' tax
laws. See id.
255 See id. at 2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256 See id.
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2308 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260 See id. In fact, the Justice noted, "[a]s today's imposition, and others this
single
Term, show, this places it beyond the power of a 'single courageous State,' not only to
introduce novel dispositions that the Court frowns upon, but to reintroduce, or indeed
even adhere to, disfavored dispositions that are centuries old." Id.
261 See id. at 2308, 2309 (Scalia, J., dissenting). After extracting an excerpt from
"The Code of a Gentleman," a booklet that all entering VMI students are required to possess at all times, the Justice proclaimed that VMI had been targeted because of its endorsement of the booklet's old-fashioned concepts such as manly honor. See id. at 2308
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice professed how impressive it was for a modern institution of higher learning to seek to instill in its students the values expressed in the book-

1997]

WOMEN WIN THE WAR AT VM1

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Virginia,262 undoubtedly one of the most anticipated cases argued before the Court in
1996, sparked a great deal of controversy throughout the nation while
inflaming the passions and emotions of many men and women. Many
commentators have characterized the contested decision as simply a court
order unlatching the doors of America's last all-male military academy
and finally allowing women, who had been locked out for 150 years, to
set foot inside. Others, however, have recognized that the decision and
the implications it carries for the future extend far beyond the admission
of women into a single all-male military academy.
First, the Court's decision will inevitably affect all future claims of
gender discrimination brought under the Equal Protection Clause. From
this point forward, courts will turn to this decision when seeking the appropriate test under which to analyze all gender-based classifications.
Although United States v. Virginia provided the Court with the opportunity to clarify the intermediate scrutiny test and to enunciate once and
for all its exact language, the Court failed to seize upon this opportunity
and instead further complicated the test by supplementing it with new
language. Resuscitating Justice O'Connor's statement in Mississippi
Universityfor Women v. Hogan 63 that the party seeking to uphold a gender-based classification must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification, 264 Justice Ginsburg incorporated this ambiguProviding neither an
ous phrase into an already nebulous test.
explanation nor any guidelines as to what may constitute an "exceedingly
persuasive justification," the majority deferred interpretation of that
phrase to a future date and thereby left the status of gender-based classifications in its pre-existing state of ambiguity.
United States v. Virginia further provided to the Court ammunition
with which to declare gender a suspect class and thus elevate genderbased classifications to the level of strict scrutiny analysis. The Court,
however, once again failed to seize upon this opportunity. The majority's numerous allusions to subjecting gender-based classifications to
heightened scrutiny have unfortunately never been converted into concrete law. Nevertheless, by supplementing the traditional test with new
language and thereby making gender-based classifications less likely to
withstand constitutional muster, the Court has in effect heightened the
level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications, though not expressly
saying so. The Court, presented with the opportunity to clarify the
let. See id. at 2309 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
20 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see also supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text
(discussing Hogan).
See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
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muddied waters of gender-based classifications, has instead squandered
that chance and provided no clear guidance as to the fate of future equal
protection claims of gender discrimination.
Second, the Court's decision will impact upon the future of both
public and private single-gender institutions of higher learning, leaving
many state government officials wondering whether they should convert
their single-gender institutions into coeducational schools or risk the
threat of future litigation. Although only a few state-sponsored singlegender institutions are currently in existence in the United States, the fate
of such schools now remains a mystery. The majority's decision relied
on the fact that VMI provided a unique opportunity to its male citizensone that was unavailable to the female citizens of Virginia. This determining factor, however, may prove to be problematic because most, if
not all, single-gender institutions can be classified as unique in one way
or another. Pursuant to the Court's decision, single-gender admissions
policies at these institutions will most likely be rendered unconstitutional
and the institutions will be forced to become coeducational. In so doing,
courts will deny to students-particularly women, who have been found
to benefit the most from this type of education265_-the benefits of a single-gender education.
The decision may also potentially reach into the private sector and
similarly affect private single-gender institutions because of the substantial state and federal government funding with which most institutions
operate. By not addressing the future of other public and private singlegender institutions and by strictly focusing on the VMI situation, the
Court may have left advocates of both public and private single-gender
institutions pondering what standards, if any, will be used to judge the
constitutionality of their schools.
Third, the United States v. Virginia decision denotes that even as the
nation approaches the twenty-first century, women must continue their
unending, historic fight against stereotypes concerning their traditional
roles and abilities against those who still believe that there are certain
places where women do not belong. Although the Court failed to seize
upon the opportunity either to clarify the intermediate scrutiny test or to
elevate gender to a suspect class, the majority is correct in following
well-established precedent and thereby reaffirming that stereotypes and
traditional notions about women cannot justify gender-based classifications.
VMI refused to admit women primarily because of the institution's
antiquated belief that women, whether qualified or not, could not and
M See generally Caplice, supra note 113 (commenting on Hogan).
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should not be forced to undergo the adversative method of education.
Thus, in attempting to protect and shield women from the harsh and
"masculine" worrld of military training, Virginia categorically denied its
female citizens-who supported VMI with their tax dollars-an extraordinary educational, professional, and personal opportunity. As is evident
from the seven-to-one decision, the United States Supreme Court recognized Virginia's conduct as a blatant and outright denial of women's
equal protection under the laws. The lower courts, however, failed to
recognize such obvious discrimination and instead concocted numerous
justifications for its continued existence. One lower court judge even
went so far as to proclaim that "[i]f VMI marches to the beat of a drum,
then Mary Baldwin marches to the melody of a fife and when the march
is over, both will have arrived at the same destination. " 266 The triumph
of United States v. Virginia is that women will no longer settle for the
less significant role of the fife 6 7 and will only be content with the best
that a state has to offer.
Yanet Perez

2M United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 484 (W.D. Va. 1994).
267 Webster's New World Dictionary defines a fife as "a small, shrill-toned musical

instrument resembling a flute, used mainly with drums in playing marches." WERSTER's
NEw WoRLD DICTIONARY 520 (2d ed. 1980).

